

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS: AN EVALUATION OF THE CHARLOTTE-
MECKLENBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT P.O.S.T. PROGRAM

A Thesis
by
DERRICK WESLEY LAIL

Submitted to the Graduate School
Appalachian State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE

December 2011
Department of Government and Justice Studies

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS: AN EVALUATION OF THE CHARLOTTE-
MECKLENBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT P.O.S.T. PROGRAM

A Thesis
by
DERRICK WESLEY LAIL
December 2011

APPROVED BY:

Elicka Peterson-Sparks
Chairperson, Thesis Committee

Tammatha Clodfelter
Member, Thesis Committee

Kenneth Mullen
Member, Thesis Committee

Brian Ellison
Chairperson, Department of Government and Justice Studies

Edelma D. Huntley
Dean, Research and Graduate Studies

Copyright by Derrick Wesley Lail 2011
All rights reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	iv
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Review of Existing Literature.....	5
Ineffective Strategies.....	5
Effective Strategies.....	11
Chapter 3: CMPD Offender-Driven Initiative.....	19
Chronic Offender Prioritization Project.....	20
Priority Offender Strategy Team.....	26
Current State of POST.....	28
Summary.....	34
Chapter 4: Methods.....	36
Goal 1.....	37
Goal 2.....	38
Goal 3.....	39

Chapter 5: Results.....	42
Goal 1.....	42
Goal 2.....	43
Goal 3.....	45
Summary.....	47
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	49
Summary of Findings.....	50
Weaknesses.....	50
Discussion.....	52
Recommendations.....	58
References.....	62
Appendix A: Memorandum of Understanding.....	67
Appendix B: POST Offender and Non-POST Offender Comparisons.....	71
Appendix C: POST Program Recommendations.....	73
Appendix D: Tables.....	74
Appendix E: Figures.....	103
Vita.....	108

ABSTRACT

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS: AN EVALUATION OF THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT P.O.S.T. PROGRAM. (December 2011)

Derrick Wesley Lail, B.A, Appalachian State University

B.S., Appalachian State University

M.S., Appalachian State University

Chairperson: Elicka Peterson-Sparks, Ph.D.

In April 2008, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) implemented an offender-driven initiative designed to identify those offenders believed to be most actively motivated to commit Part I crimes against the residents of Charlotte, North Carolina. Through a comprehensive and collaborative effort, this approach sought to prioritize available resources in a manner which would hold these identified offenders accountable for their crimes and, ultimately, contribute to a reduction in Charlotte's persistently high Part I crime. This intervention is known as the Priority Offender Strategy Team (POST). The current study illuminated various weaknesses in the actual implementation process of the POST program; however, statistically significant evidence was produced which demonstrates the program's ability to reduce recidivism by the identified motivated offenders. The author concluded that the combined support of existing literature and empirical findings allow the CMPD POST program to be considered an effective crime reduction strategy.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the Bureau of Justice released statistics reported that the United States exhibited the lowest property crime victimization since 1993. For example, the property crime victimization rate declined from 159.0 per 1,000 households in 2002 to 120.2 per 1,000 households in 2010. Violent victimization declined 33.5 percent between 2001 and 2009. Despite these reductions, however, the United States maintains a persistently high rate of Part I crime when compared to other Western, industrialized countries. Part I offenses are routinely defined as one of eight index crimes: homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson (Robinson, 2009).

Walker (2011) wrote that, while the crimes rate disparities are narrowing, “our rates of violent crimes are still much higher than those of other industrialized societies (pg. 62). For example, in 2009, Japan’s National Police Agency reported 1.7 million penal code offenses known to the police. Of those documented incidents, 1.3 million were larceny (www.npa.go.jp/english/kokusai/19.pdf). By comparison, the United States experienced approximately 16.45 million reported thefts (personal theft, residential burglary, motor vehicle theft, theft), according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2009). More specifically, 135 per 1,000 households reported property crime-related victimization in 2008. In addition to these property offenses, roughly 19 per 1,000 persons were the victims of a violent offense. Walker (2011) highlighted that the American murder rate was, in the recent past, four times higher than Canada’s and ten times higher than England’s and West Germany’s. Similarly, the robbery rate was five times higher than that of England and West Germany.

Like the rest of the nation, the crime rates in Charlotte, North Carolina have exhibited a noticeable decline (CMPD, 2011; www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html). However, Charlotte has also maintained a persistently high overall rate compared to the national average. For example, Table 6 illustrates that both the overall reported violent and property crimes (as well as all Part I crimes) in Charlotte declined from 2009 to 2010 (CMPD, 2011). However, Figure 4 demonstrates that the Charlotte burglary rates have remained considerably higher than the national average (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html).

While it is clear that America is experiencing a sustained drop in crime, it is also evident that the current rates remain undeniably high. As these rates persist, crime reduction strategies continue to dominate American policy discussions (for example, Raymond and Menifield, 2011; Temple, 2011). Especially when considered within the context of the current American economic crisis, it is imperative that the elected strategy be the most effective and efficient option possible.

Numerous researchers have supported one particular strategy, which is founded on the proclamation that a small subset of individuals within a given population is responsible for a disproportionate amount of overall crime (e.g., Bhati, 2007; Shannon, McKim, Curry, and Haffner, 1988; Tracy, Wolfgang, and Figlio, 1985; Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972). This offender population research has even been applied to the extent that investigators have attempted to predict the individuals who will commit the highest frequency of offenses in the future (e.g., Blumstein, Farrington, and Moitra, 1985; Blumstein, 1995; Farrington and Tarling, 1985; Fagan and Guggenheim, 1996; Farrington, 1986; Jennings, 2006). The prediction instruments in these studies, however, consistently produced accuracy rates

hovering around only 50 percent, with specific concerns of false positives (Wenk, Robinson, and Smith, 1972).

Though predictive efforts have not produced inspiring results, prominent scholars, such as Felson (2006) and Walker (2011), agree that there is merit to the strategy of identifying and addressing the small percentage of highly motivated offenders. Such offender-driven efforts must then be included in a comprehensive action plan if law enforcement agencies are to effectively reduce crime within that jurisdiction. Therefore, the current thesis presents a description and evaluation of a strategy recently implemented by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Accepting the aforementioned research regarding motivated offenders, CMPD implemented an initiative known as the Priority Offender Strategy Team (POST). This program is designed to concisely focus departmental resources toward increasing the level of supervision of and eliminating the opportunity for this small percentage of offenders to perpetrate. In doing so, CMPD intends to maintain and/or increase the decline in reported Part I Offenses in Charlotte.

An analysis of Charlotte's POST program is especially important in two respects. First, the POST program was the only program of its kind in North Carolina at conception. Previously, the most closely-related program was the Repeat Offender Prosecution Enforcement (ROPE) project in Fayette County, Georgia, which also accepts that six percent of offenders commit 70 percent of crime. This program, however, focuses only on career criminals (<http://www.lexingtonprosecutor.com/Default.htm>). The second area in which an evaluation of the POST program is particularly noteworthy is that a program such as POST program has the potential to serve as an effective crime reduction model, especially as it is

grounded in both a widely accepted criminological theory and considerable research suggesting that such an approach would more significantly and efficiently reduce crime than traditional law enforcement approaches.

The current evaluation will begin with a review of existing crime reduction strategy literature. In distinguishing between effective and ineffective attempts, theoretical support will be provided for the POST program. Various data will then be used to demonstrate the program's ability to effectively reduce recidivism by this prioritized group of motivated offenders, contributing to a decline in Charlotte's Part I crime rate. The assessment will be supplemented by exploring identified weaknesses in both the implementation of the action plan and the current evaluation, providing research-based recommendations when appropriate.

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

Ineffective Strategies

Before a determination can be made regarding the effectiveness of the current program, a discussion is necessary regarding the additional array of police strategies often employed in an effort to control crime trends. When proposing a crime reduction strategy, it is important to ensure that the recommendation consider the conclusions of empirical research regarding what practices do and do not effectively influence crime. As Walker (2011) stated, the criminal justice system is “overloaded by bad policies” (pg. 53). It is the responsibility of the policymakers to acknowledge and learn from the research regarding these bad policies.

Preventative Patrol

Since the 1800s, routine police patrol has epitomized the most common crime reduction strategy employed by law enforcement (Walker, 2011). The idea is simple: a visible police presence deters crime (Sherman, 1997). If accepting this logic at face value, it would stand to reason that increasing visibility would produce a decline in crime within that particular area. Despite the popularity, however, visible patrol as a form of effective deterrence was discredited by Kelling, Pate, Diekman and Brown (1974) in the celebrated Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment (KCPPE).

The authors of the KCPPE divided a patrol district into individual beats. The proactive beat consisted of a multi-time increase in the level of patrol. The reactive beat did not patrol, simply responding to calls for service. The control beat maintained normal patrol levels. Through a victimization survey, the authors concluded that an increase in

preventative patrol had no impact on crime or the fear of crime. Furthermore, crime did not increase in beats that operated on reactive patrol, alone (Kelling et al., 1974).

In a similar project initiated in Newark, New Jersey for The Police Foundation, Kelling, Pate, Ferrara, Utne, and Brown (1981) conducted an experiment in order to determine the impact foot patrol exhibited on crime in a given area. By matching eight similar beats, the authors discontinued foot patrol in four of the beats for nearly one year. As with the KCPPE, the authors surmised that foot patrol had no impact on the crime rates. To its credit, however, increased levels of foot patrol were associated with an increase in citizens' perception of safety within the area.

In a more contemporary publication, Felson (2006) also argued that even the most supervised location/person can quickly and easily become the next victim of a motivated offender.

"A thorough burglary requires a higher level of abandonment, but most burglaries take five minutes or less...To carry out a quick but noisy crime, an offender needs little time but enough space to buffer the sight and sounds. When supervision is low enough, a greater variety and number of offenses can be easily carried out" (pg. 84).

For this reason, Felson concluded that the traditional methods of patrol are inadequate to effectively control crime.

Despite these findings, preventative patrol persists as a popular law enforcement strategy (Walker, 2011). Therefore, Eck and Maquire (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of 27 studies related to the impact the number of police exhibit on crime. The authors found that 20 percent of the reviewed studies attributed lower crime rates to an increase in police. Eck and Maquire, however, also noted that 30 percent found that more police actually resulted in an increased crime rate. These mixed results are of particular concern in the search for an effective crime reduction model, when applied to the findings of a study by

Zhao, Scheider, and Thurman (2002). Specifically related to grants to increase the number of law enforcement on the streets, the authors reported that one dollar in grant money per city resident yielded a 5.26 decline in violent crimes per 100,000 people. However, as Walker (2011) illustrated using Omaha, Nebraska, this decline comes at a cost of nearly \$19,400 per violent crime prevented. This example of ineffectiveness is consistent with a 1978 publication by Kenneth Chelst, which estimated 1 percent of crimes to be intercepted in progress at a price tag of \$2 billion annually in preventative patrol.

Even the push for faster response times has proven to be a futile strategy in the effort to reduce reported Part I crime (Walker, 2011). Spelman and Brown (1984) emphatically stated that rapid police response to a reported Part I crime facilitated an arrest in only three percent of the reviewed instances. The authors attributed this dismal outcome to the reality that only approximately 30 percent of all calls for service involve criminal activity. Walker (2011) provided an estimate as low as 17 percent. Thus, a quicker response offers little benefit.

Reliance on Detectives

With the front line of defense exhibiting little impact on crime rates, a logical intuitive progression is to redirect reliance onto the detectives tasked with investigating the remaining 99 percent of reported incidents not intercepted during the commission (Chelst, 1978). Especially as primetime television shows, such as *CSI: Miami*, sensationalize the Sherlock Holmes-esque ease and efficiency with which super sleuths identify and apprehend offenders (Robinson, 2011), society's perception of the role of detectives in reducing crime is skewed by myths (Walker, 2011). Of greater concern, however, is the potential for these

misperceptions to manifest in the decisions and policy implementations of department administrators, the court system and lawmakers.

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (2011) annual Uniform Crime Reporting handbook (UCR), nearly 50 percent of reported violent incidents are cleared by arrest or exceptional means. This is not surprising upon considering that more than half of reported violent incidents involve a suspect who is known by the victim/reporting person (Bureau of Justice, 2011). However, less than 20 percent of property crimes are cleared by arrest or exceptional means (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). The UCR author did not even note a percentage of property crime committed by a stranger. More concerning is that the UCR reported that the 20 percent national clearance rate is slightly inflated by a 21.1 percent clearance rate for larceny; burglaries and auto thefts each maintain just above the ten percent mark (12.4 burglary, 11.8 auto theft).

As previously stated, nearly 14.8 million property crimes were reported in 2010 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). This total is a gross representation of the caseloads assigned to individual detectives within a given jurisdiction. Therefore, it was but an affirmation to review Walker's (2011) analysis of the credence in reliance on detectives as an effective crime reduction strategy.

Walker (2011) explained that a typical case gets an average of about four hours' work, the majority of which is paperwork. Thus, the investigators must rely on someone else to provide the information necessary to solve the case. Spelman and Brown (1984) illustrated that 75 percent of crime-related calls for service are dispatched long after the incident actually occurred. Outside of a witness available and willing to provide actionable

information, it is unlikely that the reporting officer will present the detective with the necessary lead to identify and apprehend the responsible offender.

Another potential information source is Crimestoppers. With this system, a caller may provide information to law enforcement regarding a specific criminal incident in return for monetary reward. The caller is assigned an identification number in order to maintain anonymity. Gresham, Stockdale, and Bartholomew (2003) assessed the Crimestoppers system. The authors determined that – of the 56,555 calls documented in 2000 – 9 percent lead to a successful outcome. The study also demonstrated that 43 percent of the successful outcomes (in the UK) were specific to drug offenses. Therefore, an actionable tip is unlikely to arise and aid the assigned investigator.

The final source hope for investigators to identify a suspect is forensic evidence. The belief is that, with time and patience, a fingerprint or DNA match will provide the identity of the offender. Discouragingly, however, Walker (2011) reported that the New York City police are able to obtain usable prints in approximately 10 percent of all burglaries. When applied to Charlotte, for example, that equates to 10 percent of 30,221 burglaries in the past 3 years (see Table 7). Similarly, DNA evidence was “remarkably successful” by providing an identity match to reported property crimes in only 1 percent of the 295,865 samples collected in Virginia as of 2009 (DNA initiative).

Three-Strikes Laws

With the awareness that law enforcement actions like preventative patrol and reliance on detectives exhibit little impact on crime, the wishful expectation exists that the worst offenders will eventually be arrested and be incapacitated under available sentence enhancements. As Kathleen Auerhahn (2002) wrote, “In recent years, there has been an

increased emphasis on particularistic types of sentencing reform – reforms that promise to target and incapacitate certain types of individuals” (p. 354). Nearly every state in America now utilizes some form of sentence enhancements once an offender receives three consecutive felony convictions. These three strikes laws, however, contain numerous weaknesses in the attempt to reduce offending by motivated offenders.

First, habitual offender enhancements have exhibited mixed results at best (Auerhahn, 2002; Jones and Newbern, 2006; Kovandzic, 2001). Second, habitual offenders who receive sentence enhancements often have aged out of the peak criminal offending years (Adler, Mueller, and Laufer, 2001; Kovandzic, 2001; Stolzenberg and D'Alessio, 1997). Blumstein (1995) described how the frequency with which offenders commit various property and violent crimes begins to spike around age 15, peaking near age 17. Property crime begins to diminish after age 21; violent crime frequency slows after age 24. Yet, third-strike offenders who receive enhancements are an average of 36 years of age (Auerhahn, 2002).

Last, the likelihood of reoffending is negatively correlated to the length of time between incidents. A report by the Bureau of Justice (2002) documented that 10.6 percent of prisoners released in 1994 were convicted of new charges within six months; this number doubled after one year of being released. Kurlycheck, Brame, and Bushway (2006) supported these findings, also describing the potential for reoffending to be greatest during the first six months following a previous contact. Habitual offender laws often attach to convictions obtained throughout the course of numerous years. While sentence enhancements could be helpful in incapacitating career criminals such as Richard Allen Davis, who abducted and murdered 12-year-old Polly Klaas in October 1993 (Auerhahn,

2002), the benefits appear to provide little assistance in the mission to target actively motivated offenders.

Summary

If a proposed project, program or policy is to be an effective crime reduction strategy, it must consider previous attempts which have been proven ineffective. Scholars have clearly demonstrated that traditional strategies of unleashing patrol and increasing detectives have little impact on the clearance of reported property crimes. In addition, the reliance on sentence enhancement to incapacitate chronic offenders appears to be similarly ineffective. Walker (2011) concluded that “(t)he key to solving crimes and making arrests, in short, is *information about a specific suspect*” (pg. 108, original emphasis), and that “(f)ingerprints, blood samples, and hair specimens are not what solve most cases. Information about a suspect does” (pg. 110). This author maintains that intervention efforts must begin with this assertion.

Effective Strategies

As identified ineffective strategies are acknowledged and discarded from the design of a new crime reduction initiative, consideration must also be given to those efforts which are supported by empirical research. Rather than the “intuitively appealing tactics of preventative patrol and rapid response” (Kappeler, 2006, pg.14), a successful anti-crime effort should approach a defined problem by incorporating beneficial aspects from models already evaluated and affirmed in existing literature. Discussed below are three tactics that have been awarded such support. While the below approaches may not be policing strategies, per se, a later discussion will describe how each is included in the CMPD POST program offender-driven initiative.

Identifying Motivated Offenders

In 1972, Marvin Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin provided a landmark study, which suggested that an identifiably small number of individuals within a population are responsible for a majority of reported offenses. The study collected delinquency records from a cohort of males born in 1945, ages 10-18, who had resided in Philadelphia throughout the duration of their lives. By comparing 3,475 males, Wolfgang concluded that 6.3 percent of the population was responsible for 52 percent of the reported offenses. In an effort to confirm the original findings, Wolfgang and associates initiated a replication study (Tracy, Wolfgang and Figlio, 1985). The replication compared records of 28,338 males born in Philadelphia in 1958. The study concluded, similarly, that 7.5 percent of the cohort represented the motivated offenders.

To demonstrate that a small group of offenders exist beyond the sample of Philadelphia, Shannon, McKim, Curry, and Haffner (1988) published a study including three cohorts in Racine, Wisconsin. The cohort consisted of 6,127 participants born in 1942, 1949 and 1955. Similar to Wolfgang, this study found that, across three separate populations, an average of 7.8 percent of the cohort was responsible for a majority of the reported offenses. This is of particular interest since the cohort contained only an 11 percent minority population.

From a law enforcement policy perspective, there appears to be a consistent pattern in which a majority of reported crime can be attributed to roughly 5 to 10 percent of a population. Therefore, “(i)f we could successfully identify and effectively respond to that 6 percent, we could achieve a major reduction in serious crime” (Walker, 2011, pg.78). First, as previously discussed in regards to clearance rates, the odds of arresting an offender for a

crime (particularly a non-violent Part I offense), are only favorable if information about the suspect is presented to the assigned investigator. A figure from the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Task Force Report (in Walker, 2011) depicts the reality that only 12 percent of the 1375 cases reported to the Los Angeles Police Department without a named suspect in 1966 were cleared. A concentration of resources toward this small percentage of motivated offenders should increase the amount of usable information about the offender and his/her close associates.

The second benefit to identifying the highly motivated offenders is the potential for prevented crimes. Undeniably, much debate exists regarding the most accurate estimate of motivated offender crime rates or λ (Auerhahn, 1999; Auerhahn, 2002; Bhati, 2007; Jennings, 2006; Marvell and Moody 1994; Piquero and Blumstein, 2007; Spelman, 1994; Zimring and Hawkins 1995). If nothing more, these studies consistently agree that estimates vary among authors and prediction mechanisms. More relevant to the current evaluation, however, is that a small percentage of the sample populations were found to skew the averages due to their high frequencies. For example, Bhati (2007) noted that "only 5 percent of the releasees would have committed more than five crimes" (pg. 11).

Prioritizing Offenders

Numerous scholars have detailed the reemergence of incapacitation through incarceration as the preferred method of crime control (Auerhahn, 1999; Auerhahn, 2002; Piquero and Blumstein, 2007). Incapacitation is founded in the assumption that incarcerated offenders will be prevented from victimizing additional members of society by being removed from that society (Bhati, 2007; Marvell and Moody 1994; Piquero and Blumstein, 2007; Spelman, 1994; Zimring and Hawkins, 1995). This shift in punishment style,

combined with the aforementioned high crime rates, has caused the number of American state and federal inmates to increase from approximately 200,000 in 1973 (Bhati, 2007) to 2.3 million in 2008 (Liptak, 2008).

However, this method must be considered from an economic perspective. The cost for the 2.3 million inmates to federal, state and local governments was approximately \$75 billion in 2008 (Schmit, Warner, and Gupta, 2010). While research such as Levitt (2004) and Spelman (2005) report declines of 25-33 percent in crime rate attributable to incarceration boom in 1990s, scholars qualify that gross incarceration is an ineffective reduction method (Walker, 2011). Therefore, attention must be directed to the noticeable portion of these offenses which appear to be committed by a small percentage of offenders.

In addition to the financial considerations, research suggests that a decrease in time between charge and disposition exhibits a positive impact on crime, especially with consideration to a small, motivated offender population. According to statistics by the Bureau of Justice (2007), 11 percent of defendants on pretrial release from 1990 to 2004 were charged with a new felony. Also, eight percent of defendants were rearrested for a new offense within the first week of release. The report specified that those defendants on pretrial release, probation or parole at the time of the current arrest/release were more likely to be rearrested (failure to appear or new offense). Walker (2011) recommended speedy disposition as a solution. Acknowledging that this practice has been enacted in many states but often avoided, Walker proposed that dispositions should be expedited “for only those offenders who are high risks” (pg. 154).

Evidence-Based Interventions

The final review of effective crime reduction strategies relates more directly to planning and implementation practices. Regardless of the targeted crime trend, an agency's response should follow a series of steps in order to ensure that the response is the best solution possible (Welsh and Harris, 2008; www.popcenter.org). As Walker (2011) wrote, "(E)ffective police anti-crime efforts are not a matter of simply 'more cops' or 'working harder,' but of attacking crime and disorder intelligently and using an evidence-based approach" (pg. 94). Following discussion of evidence-based strategies, an example of a successfully planned intervention will be provided, completing the literary review serving as the foundation for the current evaluation of the CMPD POST program.

Planned versus unplanned change. Welsh and Harris (2008) began their policy and planning guideline by calling immediate attention to a similarity among the numerous ineffective responses to identified crime trends. "The problem is that many criminal justice interventions fall short of their goals because of poor planning, poor implementation, and poor evaluation" (pg. 2). Unplanned change is characterized by reactionary responses to major incidents or issues perpetuated by politics or the media. These reactions often lack significant proactive planning and typically include strategies that are more intuitive or faith-based than research-based. Welsh and Harris (2008) called unplanned implementations "wasteful of valuable public resources" (pg. 3). Conversely, planned change consists of crime trend interventions deriving from evidence analyses and proactive planning.

Drawing on research by Goldstein's Problem-Oriented Policing (www.popcenter.org), Walker's (2011) assessment of effective and ineffective crime reduction strategies and Welsh and Harris' (2008) planning and policy guide, the explanation

of planned change can be summarized into five characteristics. First, planned change should be limited in scope. By focusing on precise problems, proposed solutions can be evaluated by clear, concise goals and objectives. Second, planned change often includes a role for consumers. Who has an interest at stake? The scholars concur that an effective strategy would emphasize inclusive partnerships between law enforcement and the residents, business owners, customers, etc., in an effort to promote sustainability. Third, planned change exhibits accountability. Welsh and Harris (2008) prescribed a designated individual responsible for the implementation coordination, assessment and revision of the intervention. However, if no single person is tasked with this responsibility, a process must be in place to monitor the implementation and progress of the initiative.

The fourth characteristic of planned change is its flexibility. Many have heard the adage, “The only things certain in life are death and taxes.” This humorous expression summarizes Felson’s (2006) observation that life is capable of – and often tends to – change at any time. According to Felson, life is characterized by seven requirements which facilitate adaptation and growth. Felson took this observation and devoted an entire chapter in *Crime and Nature* to explaining, in detail, the ways in which crime is consistent to each of those requirements. From this explanation, Felson illustrated that criminals adapt to prevention strategies; therefore, implemented strategies must be dynamic. The key to flexibility is proper evaluation and revision (Walker, 2011; Welsh and Harris, 2008; www.popcenter.org).

Systematic strategy implementation. Both Goldstein (www.popcenter.org) and Welsh and Harris (2008) have presented a process for implementing and evaluating a response to a crime trend. Though slight variations exist, the two models are consistent in the major steps. As visual examples, basic diagrams of the models are available in Figure 5.

First, the scholars agree with Walker (2011) that any initiative is weakened at the onset if the identified problem is not properly analyzed. Careful problem identification provides the aforementioned narrowed focus, ultimately allowing for the statement of specific goals and objectives. The second critical stage is the consideration of existing research. Policymakers should consider what responses have been proven effective in similar instances, while avoiding those that have been deemed ineffective. Such consideration also bolsters any subsequent conclusion that the new strategy was responsible for a significant crime reduction. Third, the agency must meticulously monitor the actual implementation. This ensures that the intended process is being followed. Fourth, the strategy must be regularly evaluated to determine if the stated goals/objectives are being attained, while reassessing the status of the originally identified problem. From the evaluation outcome, revisions must be applied, if the problem is determined to still warrant law enforcement attention (Walker, 2011; Welsh and Harris, 2008; www.popcenter.org).

Example of planned change. In 2009, the Merseyside Police (UK) identified a trend of increased thefts from person in a small geographic location. From January 1, 2009 to June 30, 2009, the police received reports of 12 purse thefts from all-female victims averaging 74 years of age. With an upward estimate of 60,000 tourists per day visiting the problem location, Merseyside Police applied the SARA Model and designed a reduction strategy (Fairbrother, 2010).

First, Merseyside Police considered previous attempts and existing literature regarding the identified problem. They then designed a comprehensive strategy, which included law enforcement and victim education as a supplement to the proactive law enforcement efforts. The agency also made efforts to address each side of the crime triangle.

Finally, the initiative was evaluated. The authors reported that incidents reported in the target location were reduced from 7 in 2009 to 0 in 2010. Similarly, the incidents in the surrounding displacement area were reduced from 4 to 2. Thus, the strategy was determined to be successful.

Summary

Building on the existing literature regarding ineffective intervention efforts, any strategy that is to be considered as an effective crime reduction model must next consider and apply existing findings on previously effective approaches. This section provided support for three such methods: identifying motivated offenders, prioritizing offenders, and evidence-based interventions. With this literary foundation, especially in light of the strong scholarly mandate for implementation assessment, the thesis now transitions into an evaluation of the CMPD POST program. The evaluation will begin with an explanation of the program, itself, and the various stages of implementation and growth, thus far.

CHAPTER 3: CMPD OFFENDER-DRIVEN INITIATIVE

As of July 2009, Charlotte, North Carolina had an estimated population of 709, 441 residing within the 242.3 square miles. The racial composition of the population at the time of the snapshot was 47.9 percent white, followed by 32.7 percent black. The median resident age was 32.7. The median household income was \$49,779 (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html).

Charlotte has enjoyed declines in Part I crime rates consistent with the national trend. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department reported that total Part I crime declined 11 percent (41,916 to 38,297, respectively) from 2009 to 2010 (CMPD, 2011). However, as of 2009, the Part I crime rate in Charlotte was 589.2 per 100,000 residents, compared to the national average of 320.9 per 100,000 residents (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html).

As part of an effort in early 2008 to identify the cause for rates persistently above the national average, CMPD drew attention to the fact that certain individuals continued to be named as suspects in Part I offenses. For example, the CMPD internal reporting management system documented that one individual was arrested, in the short span of 28 months, on 15 occasions for 20 separate offenses (11 of which were Part I offenses). The final two offenses before this individual received active incarceration were armed robberies. However, with the exception of rarely applicable and rarely employed habitual felon sentencing enhancements, CMPD had no established means of addressing this defined problem.

Led by the CMPD Field Services chain of command, the push began to determine an effective response to the crime rates. Field Services is comprised of 13 patrol divisions, each of which is further divided into beats or response areas. Each division also utilizes various non-investigative support groups, such as Focus Mission Teams, traffic enforcement officers and alcoholic beverage enforcement officers. Therefore, CMPD already had measures in place to address the crime triangle from the perspectives of the opportunity for crime and potential victims (Felson, 2006; www.popcenter.org). For example, through monthly CompStat, a mapping system provides department leaders with detailed information regarding non-offender-specific crime trends (Henry, 2002), allowing for the appropriate redirection or reallocation of Field Services' resources. However, the Field Services chain of command acknowledged the aforementioned lack of control for the third side of the triangle, those individuals who exhibit a persistently high motivation to offend.

Chronic Offender Prioritization Project

The CMPD offender prioritization initiative was implemented in April 2008 as the Chronic Offender Prioritization project (COP). COP sought to aggressively focus the department's efforts on the offenders believed to be responsible for a significant portion of Charlotte-Mecklenburg's reported Part I incidents. The project stated three goals: to identify Charlotte's chronic offenders, to hold these offenders accountable for their criminal actions, and, ultimately, to reduce Charlotte's Part I crime rates.

To satisfy the first task of identifying those most prolific offenders, nominations for the first list were provided to the COP Executive Staff by each of the 13 patrol divisions. This nomination method remains the standard presently, as the founders strongly believe that actionable intelligence regarding active offenders originates in patrol. Upon nomination,

data is collect for eight influential factors. Each factor is assigned a weight that was implemented by COP and accepted by CMPD (see Table 8). The offenders were then numerically ranked. The decision to accept an individual as a COP project “chronic offender” was made by the Executive Staff upon combined consideration of the divisions’ information regarding the offender’s impact on that division, the types of offenses attributed to the offender, and the numerical ranking.

Regarding the next goal of holding the chronic offenders accountable for their crimes, the COP project accepted the assertion that incapacitation through incarceration (Levitt, 2004; Spelman, 2005) was the most effective method. Thus, the founders established a partnership network designed to emphasize the development of solid felony cases, with the intent to prioritize the identified offenders, facilitating higher conviction rates and a greater likelihood of incarceration upon conviction. From its original inception, the COP project tapped resources from all throughout the department. Each centralized investigative unit was advised of the project and its expectations of that unit when a project offender was involved. Understanding that incarceration is not the only incapacitation option available, COP networked with the CMPD Electronic Monitoring unit, who endorsed the notion of emphasized requests for and attention to the monitoring of prioritized offenders. The CMPD Police Attorneys’ Office also nominated a representative to provide legal input to the COP project and to review felony cases against COP offenders.

In addition to CMPD representatives, the COP project also included participants from various partnering agencies, in an effort to create the most comprehensive and inclusive implementation possible. The Mecklenburg County District Attorney’s Office designated a single Assistant District Attorney from the property offense (burglary, larceny-theft, motor

vehicle theft) prosecution team and the persons offense (homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, select firearms-related charges) prosecution team. The North Carolina Department of Community Corrections agreed to prioritize and closely monitor the behavior of COP offenders serving active probation sentences in Mecklenburg County.

Once an individual was designated as a COP offender, the individual was assigned for supervision and bi-weekly evaluation by the COP Executive Staff. Most often, the division which submitted the nomination was assigned the offender; however, in the rare instances when an offender clearly impacted an area other than the division submitting the nomination, the offender was assigned to the impacted division. The initial project did not require specific division representatives to be tasked by the Executive Staff with the offenders' status. Rather, monitoring strategies were left to the discretion of division leadership, with accountability ultimately falling upon that supervisor. However, with the emphasis on proactive enforcement and meticulous investigation management, it quickly became common practice for divisions to designate consistent, non-supervisory representatives to the project, if even in a dual-function role. Therefore, many COP project case managers also served as community policing officers or divisional investigators, in addition to the COP responsibilities.

The COP project provided a protocol for CMPD employees, which applied not at the point of arrest, but from the moment in each investigation in which probable cause to file criminal charges was obtained. For example, if the involved investigator was assigned a case for further investigation, he/she was directed to cross-reference any named individuals from the incident with the COP project list. If the identified suspect was a prioritized offender, the investigator was instructed to present the completed case file, prior to seeking

warrants, to a representative from the CMPD Police Attorneys' Office for review. Following approval, the COP project would then support the investigator obtaining warrants for the offender.

Upon arresting a prioritized offender, the arresting officer was instructed to contact the respective divisional COP project supervisor for notification and/or additional guidance. The division representative was also responsible, at this point, for determining if electronic monitoring should have been requested from the Magistrate. This contact also provided the division representative(s) with the opportunity to attempt a custodial interview of the offender, should such an opportunity have been desired. In addition, prior to custody being transferred to the Mecklenburg County Sheriff's Office at arrest processing, the arresting officer was responsible for presenting an arrest affidavit which had been reviewed and approved by a Sergeant and clearly highlighted that the prisoner was a CMPD "chronic offender." The Magistrates were then expected to consider this prioritization when administering monetary bonds and/or electronic monitoring orders. Per the COP Executive Staff, this process also applied to any CMPD officer whom may have unknowingly come in contact with and arrested a COP project prioritized offender.

COP divisional representatives were expected by the Executive Staff to attend bond hearings for their respective chronic offenders. The purpose was to answer any potential question raised by the prosecutor of the Judge regarding the offender and/or the related incident. It has also become common practice in Mecklenburg County for the Judge to request input from the arresting agency regarding bond considerations. If electronic monitoring was not ordered by the Magistrate, then the division representative would have typically extended the request to the Judge during the bond hearing. Finally, as cases

progressed toward the prosecution stages, the Police Attorneys' Office provided one-on-one training for the involved officer(s) to ensure the best presentation of evidence by the prosecution as possible.

Though the project clearly stated various logical goals, no operational objective was ever defined with which to measure the project's success in achieving those goals, especially the third goal of contributing to the reduction in Charlotte's Part I crime. Collected data from the original Chronic Offender Prioritization project consisted of the number of new incidents in which the offender was named as a suspect, number of arrests, number of convictions, and number of documented contacts by CMPD officers. In addition, any prioritized offender who served more than 30 days in custody (jail or prison) was tabulated, as 30 days was the arbitrary operational definition of a COP Project success. The 30 day success measure was counted out of the assertion that incapacitating a prolific offender was preventing that offender from committing new Part I offenses, thus reducing crime. A determination of "success" did not automatically remove an individual from the prioritization list; rather, each offender was re-evaluated upon release from custody. Therefore, when analyzing the totals, it is important to recognize that a single offender could have accounted for multiple project successes under this operational definition.

As the COP project neared the first year of existence, the Executive Staff began to foresee the prospect of COP perpetuating within CMPD and, potentially, evolving into a crime reduction model for external agencies. Therefore, the COP Executive Staff undertook extraneous preliminary measures ensure legitimacy and a smooth transition. First, the Executive Staff affirmed the importance of including several criminal justice partners to ensure the most effective identification and prioritization of offenders, as well as provide the

respective managers with the most advantageous resource options. This comprehensive offender-focused program became known as the Priority Offender Strategy Team (POST) and consisted of representatives from CMPD, the Mecklenburg County District Attorney's Office, the Magistrate's Office, the North Carolina Department of Community Corrections, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The Executive Staff then administered an official Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between participating entities (see Appendix A).

Next, existing research regarding similar efforts was considered (e.g., Jacoby and Mayer, 1989; Martin and Sherman, 1986). The applications of this research will be further discussed in the next section. Finally, the CMPD Crime Analysis Division compiled the available data for the Executive Staff to review. The analysts determined that, in the year of the COP Project's existence, 57 offenders were "successfully" incarcerated for at least 30 days, 55 were incarcerated for at least 45 days, and 41 were incarcerated for at least 90 days. Of the original offenders, 40 received at least one felony conviction, and 24 received an average sentence of 39 months (CMPD, 2011). Realizing that this data had no similar set for comparison, CMPD noted the offender-driven initiative's potential impact and began the transition to the POST program.

The current thesis will concentrate the majority of the evaluation on CMPD's offender-driven initiative from April 2009 to October 2011, the point when the concept behind COP transitioned from a temporary pilot project to one of the department's primary crime control strategies. While the COP project was pivotal in laying the foundation for POST, it was lacking in several areas of the model for planned change. First, no measurable objectives were stated prior to the implementation of the project. Second, while productive,

the action plan was not directly tied to existing empirical research. Third, though an attempt was made, no true assessment was conducted regarding the project's success in reaching its goals, as the only operational definition provided (30 days incarceration = Success) was an invalid measure for determining if the correct offender had been selected, if the offender was held accountable for his/her crime(s) or if the project had contributed to a reduction in Part I crime.

Priority Offender Strategy Team

Since the commencement of the COP project, the POST program has undergone several changes, adhering more closely to the majors steps in the models of change in Figure 5 (Welsh and Harris, 2008; www.popcenter.org). First, COP was utilized as a tool for extensive problem analysis, confirming that certain individuals in Charlotte disproportionately contribute to the Part I crime rates. This analysis, combined with a review of some of the existing literature, altered slightly the focus of the program. Rather than concentrating exclusively on career criminals, POST clearly defined a "priority offender" as an individual whose criminal behavior significantly impacts the crime rate and/or the fear of crime in a community. The distinction is that POST recognized through the analysis that motivation may be exhibited in the form of a chronic offender who has been involved in criminal activity over a long period of time or a suspect currently involved in multiple offenses. Also, though POST typically denies those offenders who appear to strictly engage in drug crimes, the program acknowledges that highly motivated offenders are likely not specialists (Auerhahn, 1999; Felson, 2006). Therefore, POST nominations may officially include persistent property and/or violent criminals.

Second, the program's Executive Staff utilized the POST transition to officially implement many of the previously informal but emphasized expectations of the original action plan. For example, Response Area Commanders (RAC) from each patrol division were tasked to be the supervisors accountable for that division's respective POST offender(s). Also, at least one officer from each patrol division was mandated by the Executive Staff to serve as the case manager for that division's respective POST offender(s). The case manager was instructed to monitor current investigations and/or pending cases involving the POST offender, initiate proactive enforcement actions as necessary and be prepared to report cases statuses and newly-obtained intelligence information in a bi-weekly meeting with the Executive Staff.

Third, the prioritization process of these motivated offenders was clearly outlined in a memorandum and training session for program representatives. As with COP, cases with a POST offender as the identified suspect are presented to an attorney from the CMPD Police Attorney's Office for preliminary review. Upon approval, the Mecklenburg County Magistrate's Office and District Attorney's Office have agreed to give special consideration to the POST cases. This consideration is typically exhibited in the form of bond and/or pre-trial release recommendations or in resisting the nationwide norm of dismissing mediocre cases early in the proceedings. Also, the CMPD Crime Laboratory prioritizes evidence related to POST offenders on a case-by-case basis at the request of the Executive Staff (pending availability due to open homicide investigations).

The final significant program change came with the operational definition of a program success. Rather than the previously incorporated 30 day incarceration mark, the POST program increased the required incapacitation to 90 consecutive days in custody.

Though the possibility still exists that an offender would account for multiple successes upon evaluation of the data, the likelihood is – in theory – reduced by providing a more stringent operational definition. Notably, however, the evolution still did not produce clearly-stated, measurable objectives for evaluating the effectiveness of identifying the correct offenders, holding those offenders accountable for their crimes or contributing to the reduction in Part I offenses.

Once the logistics were in place, the POST program was unveiled to the department. The designated RAC and/or case managers served as the ambassadors to the Executive Staff and notified their respective divisions of the assigned offenders, expectations and operating procedures. As the program's Executive Staff perceives benefit in allowing the participants to enjoy ownership in the program, the representatives were not given a set method of dissemination to the division. Thus, some divisions utilized shift roll calls, others sent mass e-mails, while others posted visible paper notifications in the division offices. The conveyance of the program to the division was an integral step in the implementation process, as it introduced the division to the currently-assigned offenders, while opening the line of communication between the case manager (and ultimately the POST program) regarding future intelligence and/or additional nominees. At this point, the POST program began.

Current State of POST

Currently, the POST program has been in place for 30 months. Each of the 13 patrol divisions has a designated case manager; three divisions utilize multiple officers as liaisons to the program. The program currently has roughly 360 offenders being monitored. As of October 2011, 71 POST offenders are on probation. Also, 47 offenders have current orders

to wear an electronic monitoring ankle bracelet. Of those 47 offenders, 29 are in some form of custody (as of October 20, 2011), and 10 are being monitored as a condition of probation. 106 POST offenders are in active custody (90+ days).

POST has not accepted these statistics as a successful completion of the task, however. Consistent with the recommendation that crime reduction strategies be flexible and dynamic (Felson, 2006; Welsh and Harris, 2008), the Executive Staff considers bi-weekly any potential areas for growth and/or improvement. Discussions range from alterations to the POST offender list to adherence by case managers to the defined procedural expectations. An example of a proactive, dynamic response to a perceived weakness in the program is the formation of the POST TRAP team.

POST TRAP Team

In February 2010, the POST program took another innovative measure, aimed specifically at the level of supervision of the motivated offenders. The Executive Staff recognized that the prioritization process was designed to address the offenders' accountability post-arrest; however, the program still appeared to be lacking in regards to accountability for offenses not immediately known. This realization is especially relevant when considering the aforementioned findings on the ineffectiveness of case detectives. Therefore, CMPD formed the POST TRAP Team. This unit functions in an undercover capacity and serves as the operational arm of the POST program. Like POST, the officers on the TRAP Team are representatives from the various CMPD patrol divisions, many exhibiting additional departmental roles (for example, SWAT, Civil Emergency Unit, Range Safety Officer). For this reason, the POST TRAP Team has grown from six officers with rotating supervisors to more than 14 officers and a full-time sergeant.

TRAP serves a major function for the POST program. TRAP offers a group of undercover resources dedicated to supporting division investigators with individuals suspected in various Part I Offenses. This is primarily accomplished through extensive static and/or mobile surveillance, location and apprehension of wanted offenders, but may include proactive undercover operations. To maximize this support, TRAP also has three officers who oversee all investigations regarding the program's prioritized offenders, consisting of a Criminal Intelligence Officer from the Crime Analysis Division, an Electronic Monitoring Officer from the Crime Analysis Division, and an Index Offense investigator from the TRAP Team.

To date, TRAP has provided divisional assistance for approximately 1,000 unique offenders, several of which have even been submitted on multiple occasions as persistent offenders (CMPD, 2011). It must be noted that the only data consistently collected from February 2010 until June 2011 reflected those individuals arrested by TRAP. This author made an attempt to review historical records (daily activity logs, e-mail, etc.) and document those individuals submitted but not arrested; however, the information is, undeniably, incomplete.

The POST TRAP Team's services are pivotal in CMPD's ability to more closely scrutinize an offender's motivation level. The issue with the suggestion to maintain supervision of a small population of motivated offenders is the logistical difficulty of implementation. As previously stated, Charlotte has over 700,000 residents (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html), excluding those in the surrounding Mecklenburg metropolitan area or traveling to Charlotte from nearby cities. Applying the aforementioned estimates suggesting that less than ten percent of a population is responsible

for a majority of crime (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972; Tracy, Wolfgang, and Figlio, 1985; Shannon, McKim, Curry, and Haffner, 1988), CMPD should attempt to constantly supervise between 36,571 and 73,142 individuals. With only approximately 2,000 total sworn law enforcement officials, a steady daily flow of citizen-initiated calls for service and nationwide budget constraints, motivated offenders enjoy a high likelihood of escaping handler supervision. Under the operational philosophies of the POST program, TRAP is able to better provide investigators with the necessary suspect information to be able to clear reported incidents. In doing so, TRAP also aids in identifying more highly motivated offenders.

Increasing Supervision

Increasing the supervision of motivated offenders is a strategy strongly supported by scholarly research. While many popular theories seek to explain *why* an offender commits crime (e.g., Durkheim, 1964; Hirschi, 1969; Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007), an explanation of *how* an offender is able to commit crime is more relevant to the focus of the POST program. In the original Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), the authors proposed that motivated offenders simply exist and are a constant in the equation of crime.

According to the theory, supervision exists in three forms: handlers for offenders, guardians for potential targets and managers for specific places/settings (in Felson, 2006). The latter two are the more commonly employed types of supervision, for a number of reasons. As Felson explained, it is possible for a person to simultaneously serve as a target guardian and a place manager. An alert store clerk may effectively supervise the gas station and the consumable goods within, for example. In addition, situational target-hardening techniques are heavily incorporated into daily law enforcement tactics. For example, beat

officers are encouraged to serve as guardians by patrolling neighborhoods and/or businesses which report higher crime totals, increasing supervision and making a potential target more difficult to victimize.

While these supervision techniques are supported by Felson (2006), they overlook a clear recommendation. Felson wrote that, before a motivated offender can find a suitable target or an unsecured setting, he/she must first escape a handler's supervision. Without supervision, motivated offenders can maneuver anonymously through daily life. As he refers to classical sociological theories, Felson explained that anonymity facilitates crime and urges handlers to reduce the motivated offenders' ability to remain anonymous. Specifically, Felson wrote that "familiarity strengthens whoever is in the stronger position" (p. 91). Acknowledging that a motivated offender will possess a degree of familiarity with the crime to be committed – and likely the individual/location to be victimized – the handler must hold a higher level of familiarity with the offender.

In addition, Felson (2006) stated that offenders are not generalists, as exemplified by the arrest record of the aforementioned unnamed offender. Felson posited that "although it is impractical for one person to commit all types of crime or to attack all targets, it is even less practical to limit oneself to a single crime specialty" (p. 235). Comparing offenders to omnivorous North American bears, he explained that a beneficial practice for the motivated offender is to utilize a variety of crime techniques, rather than relying on a single specialty. Felson referred this practice as foraging.

As a bear in search of food, the non-specificity of foraging allows offenders to reserve the actual crime commission for the moment when the offender feels is optimal for success. Referring again to the strength of anonymity and familiarity, a motivated offender

will search for items which satisfy Felson's (2006) CRAVED acronym (concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, disposable). With this ability to forage, the offender can decide to steal an item that facilitates a successful commission and escape, instead of settling for a bulky and/or worthless booty. Similarly, foraging may allow the offender to victimize an area with which he/she is intimately familiar, rather than risking an unforeseen obstacle or danger. Both of these benefits serve to maintain the offender's anonymity.

While versatile foraging is the greatest resource for the motivated offender, the restriction of movement is the greatest limitation (Felson, 2006). However, due to the recent ability to dedicate full-time efforts to surveillance of the submitted offenders, TRAP has actually observed offenders during the commission of offenses. When visual surveillance is not employed, TRAP makes an effort to utilize various electronic monitoring devices. This form of supervision allows for retroactive investigation into an individual's involvement in reported incidents.

In addition to the physical movement limitations, POST also impacts foraging through more abstract methods. When an offender is determined to be an active offender worthy of increased supervision, his/her DNA, finger prints and photograph are all lawfully obtained and entered into the appropriate databases. This is important because offenders who forage – especially regarding property crime – will often commit crimes while completely avoiding being observed by witnesses. It is much more difficult, however, to avoid leaving forensic evidence behind. For example, an offender may escape handler supervision, even momentarily, and break into a line of unguarded vehicles in a parking lot. Without proper supervision, this type of offense is likely to go unsolved. However, by ensuring that the

aforementioned identifiers are properly entered, the increased potential for a forensic match aids in addressing foraging.

Summary

In 2008, CMPD recognized that Charlotte's Part I crime rate was persistently above the national average and that the department's best interventions ignored the existence of a small percentage of the population who commit a significant portion of the reported crime. By initiating the Chronic Offender Prioritization project, CMPD took the first step toward remedying that dismissal. After one year, CMPD used COP to affirm the need to prioritize individual offenders and – applying empirical research – implemented the Priority Offender Strategy Team program.

POST has gone to great lengths to legitimize the program, from solidifying operational protocols to creating the POST TRAP team. The various aspects of the program appear to address the weaknesses in the aforementioned ineffective traditional crime reduction strategies, while including each of the research-supported effective interventions. In addition to the prioritization mandate, the recent shift toward a supplemental emphasis on increasing the supervision of these motivated offenders bolsters the mentality to incapacitate, while offering a solution to Felson's (2006) issues of anonymous foraging. Last, the offender-driven initiatives have noticeably evolved from intuition-based ideals to research and evaluation-based standardized practices.

The most glaring weakness of the POST program is that no formal evaluation has been conducted as POST currently operates. However, with the obvious literary support, a favorable empirical assessment may justify POST not only being called an effective CMPD

strategy, but also a potential crime reduction model. The following section will provide the methodology employed in the current study to attempt such an evaluation.

CHAPTER 4: METHODS

The intent of an evaluation is to make a determination of a project/program/policy's ability to meet each of its stated goals. Ideally, the goals would include objectives which have been operationalized in a manner that would facilitate a simple calculation of the collected data. These objectives should also be valid measures of the effectiveness.

CMPD clearly listed three goals. First, the POST program seeks to identify those individuals whose criminal behavior significantly impacts the Charlotte crime rate and/or the fear of crime in a community. Second, POST intends to hold these priority offenders accountable for their criminal actions. In doing so, POST aims to attain the third goal of reducing Charlotte's Part I crime rates. Currently, however, the POST program does not have any clearly-defined objectives to serve as a mechanism for measuring the effectiveness of the strategy. Therefore, for the purpose of this evaluation, an operational definition for each goal was created and approved by CMPD before proceeding with the analyses. It must be noted that the necessary preliminary step of providing inferred, operationalized objectives likely affected the findings for each respective goal. This will be discussed later in greater detail.

For the various analyses, a data set of control offenders was generated by the CMPD Crime Analysis Division to be compared to the data set of POST offenders. Unless otherwise cited, all presented data was collected for this evaluation from the CMPD reported incident management system and the Administrative Office of the Courts (Mecklenburg County) by the CMPD Crime Analysis Division. The control offender list was produced by

executing a query of individuals documented as a suspect of a Part I offense within the past 24 months of the query. The individuals produced were then sorted in descending order by total number of reported incidents within the past 24 months.

Goal 1

In order to evaluate the POST program's effectiveness in identifying the correct motivated offenders for prioritization, the top 100 offenders from the generated control data set were first cross-referenced against the POST offenders. The reasoning behind this basic comparison was to determine the overlap of individuals that represents the top 100 recently-active offenders in Charlotte, with those who are actually POST offenders. It is important to note that suspected incidents, rather than arrests, were tabulated out of an effort to control for arrest numbers generated as a result of warrants being served on an offender while he/she was already in custody. Also, listing an individual as a suspect in a reported Part I offense requires a minimum certainty level of reasonable suspicion.

Next, based on research suggesting that offenders are most active between the ages of 16-25 (Adler, Mueller, and Laufer, 2001; Blumstein, 1995; Kovandzic, 2001; Stolzenberg and D'Alessio, 1997), the original query was filtered to include the age crime curve. The top 50 control offenders were then compared against the POST list. Arguably a more accurate representation of the most active offenders deserving of prioritization, the rationale was that the list should contain a high percentage of POST offenders.

For a final measure of the POST program's identification of actively-motivated offenders, the original control offender set was entered into the POST ranking system. The combined list was then sorted in ascending order, with the first offender being the most

actively-motivated offender. POST offenders would be expected to heavily populate this exclusive grouping of motivated offenders.

Goal 2

In order to evaluate the POST program's effectiveness in holding prioritized offenders accountable for their Part I offenses, a list was compiled of 357 POST offenders since the database was created in May 2008. Next, each offender's date of acceptance to POST was noted. With these two pieces of information, the number of felony cases attributed to each POST offender after the date of acceptance to the program was determined.

"Felony case" was operationalized as individual dates of offense. For example, Offender 183 (hypothetical) is charged with auto theft on 02/02/2011 and 02/27/2011 and is calculated as two felony cases. This definition was selected in lieu of court file numbers or case numbers to control for stacked felonies, originating from the same incident or a car break-in spree with multiple victims. The number of felony cases for each POST offender was then compared against the number of guilty dispositions associated with each particular case. Thus, the 02/02/2011 and 02/27/2011 example cases were (hypothetically) disposed by a guilty plea to the 02/27/2011 case; this would be considered two cases and one guilty disposition or 50 percent accountability.

In addition to the percentage of accountability, a pre-POST to post-POST comparison was conducted within the same offender population. Using the initial format, the number of felony cases from 01/01/2005 until 05/28/2008 was gathered. The dates were selected due to 2005 being the commencement year for the incident management system in Charlotte and 05/28/2008 being the earliest entry date noted from the POST database. Similar to the first analysis from this goal, the number of guilty disposition cases was tabulated for an

accountability percentage. This percentage was compared against the percent of accountability while on POST to assess if accountability changed per prioritized offender upon being submitted to the program.

The final analysis for this goal was to calculate the accountability for the control offenders. Any included POST offender was removed from the top 100 offender data set. The remaining 69 control offenders were reviewed from May 2008 to present. The same definitions for “felony case” and “guilty disposition” applied. This total percentage was compared against the POST offender accountability percentages.

Goal 3

Regarding the POST program’s contribution to Charlotte’s reduction in Part I crime rates, several possible methods were considered to accurately operationalize and measure the effectiveness of attaining the goal. The majority of existing research has focused on estimations of the crime rates of motivated offender (λ). However, two issues arose in the review of the research on λ , which made it difficult to apply measurements from those studies to the current assessment. First, the estimated average offending rates necessary to determine the number of crimes prevented by incapacitation ranged from 2 to 187 offenses per year (Auerhahn, 1999). To reduce the risk of over (or under) stating the effect the POST program’s incapacitation had on the identified offenders, this inconsistent estimate is avoided. Second, existing research typically divides the rates into property or violent offenses, rather than an overall rate for a motivated generalist (Auerhahn, 1999; Felson, 2006). Congruent with Felson, however, POST accepts highly-motivated offenders to be generalists. Also, the POST program seeks to contribute to Part I crime, not simply one type of crime or another.

Therefore, the assessment began with an analysis of Charlotte's Part I crime rates, in general, to determine if a crime reduction had occurred. First, in the past ten years (1999-2009), each offense category, except rape, appears to have begun a substantial decline between 2008 and 2009. The trend is especially appreciable with respect to property crime (see Table 9 from www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html). Second, data provided by the CMPD Crime Analysis Division confirmed a sustained reduction in total Part I crimes for 2010, as well (see Table 6).

Upon confirming an existing reduction in Charlotte's Part I crime, the number of program "successes" (COP = 30+ days of custody, POST = 90+ days of custody) were then tallied. Since POST accepts the assertion that selective incapacitation of highly motivated offenders is negatively correlated with crime rates (Levitt, 2004; Spelman, 2005), the evaluation needed to determine the frequency with which POST offenders were being incarcerated. Therefore, the number of successes was divided by the number of POST offenders.

As previously stated, the POST program also emphasizes incapacitation through increased supervision, consistent with the routine activities research (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 2006), which suggests that increasing the supervision of a motivated offender without incarceration could still impact that offender's criminal frequency. Currently, 71 of the POST offenders are on active probation/parole. Of the 357 offenders, 47 have electronic monitoring orders, with ten being monitored as a post-disposition condition of probation. However, the POST program does not currently have a process established to measure the impact of this emphasis. Therefore, for the purpose of the current evaluation, the number of reported Part I "suspect" offenses for POST offenders were reviewed in an effort to

determine if the program's supervision impacted the individual's offending rates and, subsequently, Charlotte's crime rates.

For this review, the number of offenses committed by each POST offender was gathered for the 12 months leading up to the offenders' respective dates of acceptance to the program. Likewise, the number was collected for Part I incidents committed by each POST offender in the 12 months following acceptance to the program. A paired t-test was then conducted in order to determine any statistically significant difference between the two groups. Data was not available for every offender for 12 months before or after acceptance to POST. Therefore, those offenders who had neither 12 months pre-POST nor 12 months post-POST were omitted from the analysis. If an offender had 12 months of data either pre-POST or post-POST, then a zero was entered as a placeholder for that offender in the respective list. The final data set was officially 166 offenders.

Finally, the CMPD Part I offense clearance rates from 2000 to August 2011 (see Figure 3 provided by CMPD Crime Analysis Division) were reviewed. The data was used to show that clearance rates are currently trending up. In addition, the clearance rates after the implementation of CMPD's offender-driven initiative were compared to the clearance rates before the implementation. Though not an analysis of suspected incidents, per se, this data is pertinent in the respect that clearance rates are not based solely on arrests. In the circumstance that an investigator has a suspect identified but is unable to pursue an arrest for a variety of reasons, the investigator may clear the case exceptionally. Drawing on Walker's (2011) proposition that better information regarding specific offenders would increase clearance rates, the current analysis is applicable.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

CMPD clearly stated three goals for the POST program. First, POST seeks to identify those individuals whose criminal behavior significantly impacts the Charlotte crime rate and/or the fear of crime in a community. Second, the program intends to hold these priority offenders accountable for their criminal actions. In doing so, POST aims to attain the third goal of reducing Charlotte's Part I crime rates. Again, with no provided objective with which to measure the program's effectiveness at attaining this or any other goal, the current evaluation created operational definitions. Various attempts were then made to quantify the results based on these created definitions.

Goal 1

The first comparison was the POST list and the generated control list of motivated offenders. Of the top 100 motivated offenders, 31 percent are on the POST list. However, 25 of the remaining 69 control offenders were in custody at the time of the analysis. The POST nomination procedures do not allow newly-accepted offenders to be in custody at the time of the submission. Therefore, it is possible that an additional percentage of these offenders will be nominated for POST upon release. This data is not available for analysis.

The second comparison was the POST list and the narrowed control list, filtered by an age range of 16-25. Of the top 50 offenders, 60 percent (30) are on the POST list. Similar to the first comparison, seven of the remaining 20 control offenders were in custody at the time of this analysis, leaving the possibility for a higher percentage of control offenders being nominated to the POST list.

The final consideration was an analysis of the representation by POST offenders in the statistical ranking system, once the motivated control offenders were entered into the equation. As this assessment is based on two sets of selection criterion (the control query and the weighted ranking system), it provides the best estimate of the individuals exhibiting the highest documented motivation to commit Part I crime within the Charlotte-Mecklenburg community. Upon execution of the ranking, 26 of the top 50 priority offenders (52 percent) were POST offenders. Of the remaining 24 non-POST offenders, 13 were in custody at the time of the analysis, allowing for additional offenders to be nominated upon release. Thus, the POST program appears to be prioritizing a majority of Charlotte's subset of active, motivated offenders.

Goal 2

The data set for this analysis consisted of 357 offenders assigned to the POST program. Since their respective dates of acceptance, POST offenders have been charged with a total of 1793 felony cases in Mecklenburg County (mean = 5.01, median = 2). POST offenders have received a guilty disposition in 621 of the 1793 felony cases. By this operational definition, POST offenders were held accountable for 34.63 percent of their felony cases (see Figure 1). A visual review of the dispositions suggested that a vast majority of the cases without a guilty disposition were dismissed by the Mecklenburg County District Attorney's Office, rather than by a not-guilty decision.

Upon removing the POST offenders from the original top 100 control data set, 69 offenders remained. Since the May 2008 designated evaluation date, these control offenders have been charged with 981 felony cases in Mecklenburg County (mean = 14.22, median = 3.5). Non-POST offenders have received a guilty disposition in 427 of the 981 felony cases.

By this operational definition, non-POST offenders were held accountable for 43.53 percent of their felony cases. However, with such a disparity in sample sizes between the two comparison groups, it is conceivable that the accountability rates of one group are not applicable to those of the other group.

To ensure the applicability of the control data set to the POST offender data set, the difference in sample size was considered. The number of control offenders was 19.33 percent that of the POST offenders. Given this percentage, it is reasonable to expect the POST offenders to have been charged with 1772 felony cases, with 771 resulting in a guilty disposition. Thus, the actual number of POST offender felony cases (1793) was consistent with the compensation for sample size. The number of guilty dispositions for POST offenders, however, remained 150 convictions below the control group (19.5%).

In an attempt to gain an understanding of the lower accountability rate for the POST offender, the felony cases charged to POST offenders before the implementation of the POST program were reviewed. Between the incorporation of the CMPD reported incident management system in 2005 until May 2008, the same POST offender data set was charged with 1884 felony cases, producing 717 guilty dispositions. Therefore, without prioritization, the POST offenders were held accountable for their offenses in a slightly higher percent of the cases (38.06) than the 34.63 percent upon assignment to the program. Several possible explanations exist for the lower accountability for POST offender, despite the prioritization goals and measure employed by the program. These explanations will be discussed later in the evaluation.

Goal 3

As described earlier, before an attempt was made to evaluate the POST program's effectiveness at contributing to the reduction in Part I crime, it was necessary to confirm that a reduction was still evident. The 1999 to 2009 summary tables available at www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html illustrate a clear downward trend in Charlotte's Part I offenses except rape (Table 9). However, this table did not provide an overall Part I crime rate. Therefore, for 2010, data was provided by the CMPD Crime Analysis Division (Table 6). This data affirmed a continued decline in Charlotte's overall Part I crime, as well. Also present in the data was a noticeable consistent reduction in property crime, specifically, from 2008 to present.

Agreeing that the Charlotte crime rate is declining, especially since the time CMPD's offender-driven initiative was implemented, the potential contribution of the proactive intervention was assessed. First, the POST program accepts the assertion that an effective method of reducing Part I crime is to selectively incapacitate the most active offenders through incarceration. The program emphasizes the development of solid felony cases, with the intent to facilitate higher conviction rates for the individual offenders and a greater likelihood of incarceration upon conviction. Therefore, the number of documented program "successes" was reviewed. As of the end of October 2011, the comprehensive initiative has accounted for 233 successes since April 2008, 36 of which were multiple periods of successful incarceration of the same offender (90+ days → release → 90+ days). In other words, 55.2 percent of POST offenders have experienced at least one period of "successful" incapacitation.

Again, as no consistent estimate for the offending rates of highly motivated criminals (λ) was presented in the existing literature, no quantification was made for the number of offenses averted by the incarceration. However, in an attempt to provide an insight to the program's actual contribution to the declining Part I crime rates, a series of in-depth comparisons regarding the reported Part I incidents attributed to these POST offenders was conducted. As a base perspective, POST offenders have been suspected in an average of 5.62 Part I offenses in Mecklenburg County within the past 24 months. Forty-two POST offenders have been suspected in 10+ felony cases in that timeframe. It is important to note, however, that – as of the end of October 2011 – nearly 48 percent (20) of these prolific POST offenders were in some form of custody.

Next, a paired t-test was used to identify any differences between the criminal motivation of POST offenders in the 12 months leading up to their acceptance to the program and the 12 months following their acceptance. Due to lacking availability of data for some offenders in either pre or post-nomination, some POST offenders were omitted from the analysis ($n=166$). Upon entering the number of suspected incidents from the appropriate time frames, the differential analysis determined that the pre-POST mean was 3.03 incidents. The post-POST mean was 0.83 incidents (see Figure 2 and Table 5). Furthermore, the t-test produced a 95 percent confidence interval for the 72.6 percent reduction (Mean = 2.2 incidents, with extreme statistical significance ($p < 0.0001$)).

The final assessment of the POST program's contribution to the Part I crime rate reduction was an analysis of CMPD's clearance rates. Founded on the assertion that clearance rates can most effectively be increased by providing the investigators with more information regarding potential suspects (Walker, 2011), it stands to reason that a properly-

identified list of actively-motivated offenders – and a program which increases the supervision of and knowledge of these offenders – would ultimately lead to higher clearance rates. Figure 3, provided by the CMPD Crime Analysis Division, reports that the clearance rates for property crimes have steadily increased since 2008. In fact, 2009 and 2010 enjoyed the highest property crime clearance rates in the 10 year period reviewed. The data for 2011 ended in August, with a 19.7 percent clearance rate at that time. The August 2011 clearance rate is 7.3 percent higher than the 2000 rate, though within one standard deviation. Therefore, though a definitive attribution is difficult to summarize from the current data, it stands to reason that the increased supervision and prioritization of the identified subset of offenders has contributed to an increase in clearance rates and a decrease in crime rate.

Summary

The POST program has provided three goals: identify the small percentage of offenders committing an disproportionate number of Part I crimes in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg community, hold those offenders accountable for their crimes through a collaborative prioritization process and, in doing so, contribute to a reduction in Charlotte's Part I crime rate. Upon creating operational definitions for each goal and collecting the necessary data to measure the program's effectiveness at attaining the goals, the final results produced a mixed assessment. According to the data presented, the program appropriately identifies roughly half of the most active and current offenders. However, as will be discussed in the conclusion, this is both an informational and a potentially misleading statistic.

Regarding the program's ability to hold POST offenders accountable for their crimes and aid in the reduction of Charlotte's crime, the current data suggests that a POST offender

is less-likely to be held accountable upon disposition than control offenders. However, this appears to be the result of plea arrangements resulting in the consolidation of numerous cases. On a positive note, the data indicates that POST offenders are significantly less likely to recidivate once assigned to the program. These findings demonstrate the POST program's potential contribution to a decrease in the number of reported incidents and an increase in clearance rates. A considerable amount of attention will be devoted to these specific results in the current conclusion.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Part I crime rate has begun to decline across the nation (Bureau of Justice, 2011). The Charlotte-Mecklenburg area has reported a similar trend. Despite these declines, however, Part I crime in Charlotte remains persistently high when compared to the national average (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html).

In April 2008, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department acknowledged that a notable portion of the reported Part I incidents was attributed to a small number of repeat offenders. Knowing that various actions are already in place to address the potential victim and crime opportunity sides of the problem analysis (crime) triangle (Felson, 2006; www.popcenter.org), CMPD implemented an initiative designed at combining a limited number of CMPD resources with various other representatives of the criminal justice system in an effort to direct attention to those offenders exhibiting a high motivation to commit Part I crimes against Charlotte's citizens. The POST program, as it came to be known, was the focus of the current evaluation.

POST has stated three program goals. The strategy seeks to identify those individuals whose criminal behavior significantly impacts the Charlotte crime rate and/or the fear of crime in a community. Second, POST intends to hold these priority offenders accountable for their criminal actions. In doing so, POST aims to attain the third goal of reducing Charlotte's Part I crime rates. The purpose of the current thesis was to evaluate the POST program's effectiveness at attaining each of these stated goals.

Summary of Findings

First, a series of comparisons to a generated list of control offenders were used to determine that POST identifies between 31 and 60 percent of the actively motivated offenders. This range was based on the comparisons of the POST data set to the first generated list of 100 control offenders (31 percent), followed by the comparison of the POST data set to the age-filtered list of control offenders (60 percent). The most narrowly filtered comparison yielded a 52 percent identification rate, with admission that additional motivated offenders have been identified but have not been accepted to the program due to being in custody.

Second, the evaluation determined that the program holds POST offenders accountable for felony crime in roughly 35 percent of the cases. This is lower than the control group's 44 percent. Third, the thesis demonstrated that 55 percent of the POST offenders have experienced at least one period of extended incarceration. Furthermore, of the top 10-12 percent of POST offenders, 48 percent is in custody. Most notably, however, is that actively motivated offenders are roughly 73 percent less likely to commit new crimes upon being prioritized by the POST program. Similarly, CMPD's property crime clearance rates increased 7.3 percent from 2000 to August 2011 and 8.7 percent from 2007 to August 2011.

Weaknesses

Before these findings can be further discussed, several weaknesses with the current evaluation must be acknowledged. Some of the weaknesses involve the availability of information necessary to accurately evaluate various aspects of the program. For example, cases presented to the District Attorney's Office could not be individually reviewed to

determine the exact reason for voluntary dismissal. Also, numerous offenders have been on the POST list for a short period of time, preventing an interpretation of the results from being completely representative of the entire population. Furthermore, some of the weaknesses stem from intangibles. For example, no law enforcement agency can identify and prioritize five percent of the offender population. CMPD would have roughly 37,500 offenders on the POST list. Also, a true determination of the number of Part I crimes averted by increased supervision or incarceration is likely improbable.

Additional weaknesses originated from the implementation process of the program and the manner in which data is currently collected. The most critical weakness is that the POST program does not currently have any measurable objectives. An absence of objectives creates multiple issues. When attempting to evaluate the program's effectiveness at satisfying the stated goals, no existing operational definition requires the researcher to create a measure or apply an existing literary standard. In such a situation, the author may potentially operationalize the goal in a manner which fails to provide a valid measurement of the effectiveness. Though CMPD approved the creation of operationalized goals for the purpose of this study, the definitions have not been formally accepted by the program nor applied as objectives. Therefore, it must be recognized that the definitions created in the current thesis may be potentially invalid measures. Though it is possible that the employed operational definitions employed may be inadequate, however, this does not nullify the empirical support produced by the current study.

In addition, with no measurable objectives, the program is not consistently gathering the necessary data for an appropriate program evaluation. Besides the obvious difficulties for the researcher, the program suffers from this, as well. Systematically collecting data specific

to the stated objectives allows for insight into the status of the program at any given snapshot in time. For example, while executing the queries used to create the comparison control offenders, multiple individuals were identified who exhibited more active motivation than some of the current POST offenders. Furthermore, the evaluation process highlighted an error in one of the fields in the ranking formula, which was updated and easily corrected.

Discussion

When determining if POST is an effective program, capable of becoming a model crime reduction strategy, certain questions were considered. Is the program supported by existing scholarly research? Do the findings demonstrate an effective benefit to the program? The current study answered each of those questions.

Literary Support

Immediately, POST begins the evaluation in the effectiveness winning column. As Walker (2011) advised, “The crucial difference is that these (effective) innovations involve carefully planned and focused police strategies that are solidly based on research evidence on what works and what does not work” (p.103). The current study briefly summarized traditionally-employed interventions, which have been proven ineffective crime reduction strategies: preventative patrol, reliance on detectives and three-strikes laws. The POST comprehensive model excludes each of these three ineffective strategies as emphasized aspects of the program.

On the contrary, the emphasized aspects of POST align well with the effective actions reviewed from the existing empirical research. The first goal of the POST program is to identify those offenders who are actively committing an disproportionate amount of Part I offenses against Charlotte’s residents. The existence of a subset of highly-motivated

offenders has been accepted by a multitude of scholars (Felson, 2006; Shannon, McKim, Curry, and Haffner, 1988; Tracy, Wolfgang, and Figlio, 1985; Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1982; Walker, 2011).

In addition to motivated offender literature, scholars lend support to the tactics employed by the POST program to specifically address identified offenders. For example, research indicates that criminals are more likely to recidivate within a short period of time from their last police contact (Bureau of Justice, 2002; Kurlycheck, Brame, and Bushway, 2006). The POST program not only factors the time lag between contact and recidivism into the weighted ranking formula, but also requires case managers to reevaluate each and every offender released from custody within 48 hours. The purpose of immediate reevaluation is to 1) confirm residency, 2) re-establish supervision and 3) confirm that the offender is still motivated to commit crime. Another example of the literary support is the prioritization of identified offenders. As Walker (2011) concluded, "If we could successfully identify and effectively respond to that 6 percent, we could achieve a major reduction in serious crime" (pg.78). As described earlier, POST has established a collaborative partnership with representatives from every step of the prosecutorial process, from Police Attorney to law enforcement to Magistrate to Crime Lab to District Attorney to Community Corrections.

Felson's (2006) research on increased supervision also specifically supports the POST program. As Felson explained, motivated offenders exhibit a number of characteristics which make reduction efforts by the police difficult. Motivated offenders are typically generalists. Motivated offenders operate in familiar settings or under considerable anonymity. Motivated offenders forage, meaning they thrive on seizing presented opportunities for quick crime strikes. POST accounts for these characteristics, however.

Through the use of static surveillance, various forms of electronic surveillance and confidential informants, prioritized offenders' ability to forage is reduced. The fact that the number of POST offender Part I incidents was reduced supports the assertion that the prioritization and supervision associated with the program impacted recidivism. An analysis of the impact of electronic monitoring on motivated offenders' recidivism is beyond the scope of the current thesis; however, it is feasible that this tactic played a substantial role in the reduction. In addition, the actionable information produced by the supervision is provided to the detectives, addressing Walker's (2011) issues with incident investigations and clearance rates.

Despite all of the theoretical support, however, the POST program cannot be recommended as an effective crime reduction model without adherence to research regarding evidence-based, planned change (for example, Walker, 2011; Welsh and Harris, 2008; www.popcenter.org). According to this literature, the project/program/policy should follow certain major sequential steps: problem analysis → evidence-based intervention design → monitored implementation → evaluation and revision. These revisions can be applied as changes to the current intervention or may facilitate the creation of a new future strategy. To supplement this planned-change process, scholars agree that the intervention strategy should also be narrowly focused. Though certain expectations have been more closely satisfied than others, the POST program has successfully achieved each of these steps.

From the initial observation of a potential crime trend, to the in-depth field analysis of the COP project, CMPD exerted considerable effort into identifying a specific, narrow problem: the persistent recidivism of Part I crime by a small number of offenders. Upon properly identifying the problem, the POST program designed an intervention strategy which

considered the traditional ineffective strategies and was guided by several forms of evidence-based information (e.g., the weighted ranking system, COMPSTAT, literature reviews). Regarding the strategy, itself, no true guiding example existed. However, recognizing this weakness, the program's Executive Staff has maintained an emphasized degree of flexibility since inception.

POST has struggled at times with monitoring the program's implementation. The bi-weekly meetings between the Executive Staff and the case managers, combined with the off-week meetings amongst just the Executive Staff, the law enforcement portion of the program is closely monitored. However, the adherence to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by other partners is typically assessed only in those rare occurrences which draw unique attention to a particular case. It is a logical assertion that some of the fault lies with the absence of measurable objectives to be periodically analyzed. The final major step – evaluation and revision – is the phase in which the program currently rests. Overall, however, the POST program adheres well to the mandate of evidence-based planned change models.

Interpretation of Findings

With overwhelming literary support, the POST program must now exhibit empirical evidence of effectiveness. Did the current study's data analyses demonstrate the program's ability to effectively identify motivated offenders, hold those offenders accountable for their crimes, and contribute to Charlotte's reduction in Part I crime? To answer concisely, the POST program is well on the way to effectively identifying motivated offenders and is reducing, without question, the amount of recidivism exhibited by those identified offenders.

The findings did not suggest the program is effectively holding the offenders accountable for their offenses, though this must not be taken completely at face value.

Regarding the identification of the correct offenders, the data demonstrated an accuracy rate ranging from 31 to 60 percent, with the most stringent comparison producing a 52 percent match. However, as was mentioned previously, 13 of the remaining 24 recommended offenders were in custody at the time of the analysis. Thus, they could not be nominated for POST, regardless of identification. Therefore, an interpretation of this result in the most literal sense should be cautious.

The more glaring findings are the contradictory analyses of the second and third goals. The paired t-test produced an average 2.2 incident reduction in the 166 POST offenders sampled within the first year of being on POST. This reduction in recidivism was reported with $p < 0.0001$. Therefore, actively-motivated offenders committed an average of 2.2 incidents within 12 months of being nominated for POST than they committed in the 12 months leading up to the nomination.

To put the program's impact into a more detailed perspective, five POST offenders who are currently in 90+ day custody and five similarly-ranked control offenders from the generated top offenders list were compared individually (see Appendix B). The five comparisons provided a clear example of the program's significant reduction in recidivism. During their similarly-ranked POST offender's incarceration periods, the control offenders were named as suspects in 41 Part I incidents (4, 6, 25, 5 and 1, respectively). Though neither the program nor this thesis attempt to estimate the number of incidents averted by incarceration, it is clear that offenders ranked similarly to the incapacitated POST offenders continued to victimize Charlotte.

With such positive findings, one would expect the conviction rate for POST offenders to be high, at least higher than the same group of offenders exhibited prior to being prioritized by the program. However, POST offenders received a guilty disposition at a lower frequency than both the control group and the comparison to the pre-nomination evaluation period. There are three possible explanations for this finding. First, the operational definition was an invalid measure of “accountability.” Second, such prolific offenders may plausibly hold a fearful reputation in the community which would hinder the District Attorneys’ ability to maintain a willing victim/witness throughout the duration of the prosecutorial process. The third – and likely – explanation is that POST offenders’ cases are being pleaded through inclusive agreements which encompass all pending matters.

It is true that POST does not seek out habitual felons for the POST list. As was explained, these offenders are often not the most active offenders in a given snapshot. However, with sentencing guidelines, the most guaranteed method of obtaining substantial incarceration is through three-strikes enhancements. It stands to reason that highly motivated offenders would have multiple cases within a short time frame, hindering the compartmentalization process without some form of consolidation. Therefore, as part of the partnership with the program, the District Attorney’s Office has conveyed the notion that plea agreements are often necessary to compartmentalize the felony convictions, satisfying the requirements of the sentence enhancements. However, the goal of the program is to ultimately hold the offenders accountable for their attributed Part I crimes, and nearly 76 percent of these offenses are not meeting this expectation.

The justification for the global plea deals is based on the assumption that the sentence enhancements are being properly utilized. However, the research demonstrated a historical

national trend of the underutilization of three-strikes laws (Auerhahn, 2002; Jones and Newbern, 2006; Kovandzic, 2001). Furthermore, since May 2008, 1164 of the 1517 Mecklenburg County habitual felon indictments have been dismissed by the District Attorney's Office (CMPD, 2011). Thus, the dismissal of POST offender cases with living, breathing documented victims as a bargaining tool seems futile and a clear breakdown in the pursuit of a stated program goal when only 22.7 percent of habitual felon indictments end with a guilty disposition.

Recommendations

Especially with a demonstrated reduction in recidivism by some of Charlotte's most active offenders, the current evaluation concludes that the POST program is an effective strategy to reduce Part I crime. The study has, however, highlighted some aspects of the program which warrant consideration. Therefore, various recommendations are provided and discussed below (see Appendix C). Certain recommendations address the design and/or implementation of the intervention strategy. Other recommendations relate specifically to the effort to direct the department's resources toward individual offenders. All recommendations are presented with the ultimate objective of bolstering the program's overall effectiveness.

First, CMPD should consider writing a mission statement for the POST program. Utilizing this study to provide scholarly references and a detailed analysis of the problem, POST must explain the need for the initiative. A mission statement may also facilitate the program evolving, again, into a formalized departmental policy.

Second, the currently stated goals should be maintained. Since goals are "broad statements intended to provide direction for change" (Welsh and Harris, 2008, pg. 94),

research supports the three goals of identifying the appropriate subset of offenders and prioritizing them in order to hold them accountable for their crimes and, ultimately, contributing to the reduction in Part I rates. However, the program must present specific, operationally-defined objectives with which to measure the outcome achieved by the intervention. Each objective should include a time frame by which the objective will be completed, a target population, a specific intended result and a standard for measuring the success. An example of an objective to measure the third goal of contributing to the reduction in Charlotte's Part I crime by reducing the recidivism of POST offenders would be as follows: After 12 months from the newly-documented start date, the average (mean) number of reported Part I incidents involving a POST offender as a suspect will be reduced 10 percent from the previous 12 month review period total. This information will be collected from the CMPD reported incident management system (KBCOPS).

Third, the POST program must establish a standard of collecting the data necessary to accurately measure each of the defined objectives. For example, in an effort to determine the program's effectiveness at holding POST offenders accountable for their crimes, it would be beneficial to document information such as offenders' POST start dates, new offense dates and disposition. Other useful data would be pertaining to custody statuses and electronic monitoring/community corrections.

Fourth, it is recommended that POST conduct quarterly recalculation of the query used in the current thesis to generate the control offender list. By doing this, the POST program will illuminate any potential candidates for review and recommendation to the case managers as candidates for the program. As part of this process, the Executive Staff should consider other selection/prediction attempts (e.g., Greenwood and Abrahamse, 1982), which

weighted juvenile histories of similar offenses and employment as indicators of future offending.

Fifth, the POST program's Executive Staff should consider proposing to the District Attorney's Office a policy regarding the speedy disposition of POST offender cases. In giving the benefit of the doubt that the police are producing adequate felony cases and the prosecutors are willing to place particular emphasis on the cases (a la three-strikes enhancements), the a possible solution to the accountability issue may be disposing of POST cases quickly. With buy-in from the Executive Staff and the Crime Lab, cooperation by the prosecutors the only necessary element.

In closing, the current thesis has identified a clear need for further research into this intervention. With the exception of a neighboring agency, which followed the example set by CMPD's program, no similar offender-driven program exists in North Carolina, to date. The current thesis provided the first true evaluation of the POST program since its implementation in the Spring of 2009. The methods used in the study produced evidence of the program's ability to significantly reduce recidivism by the defined subset of offenders. However, the study was limited in many respects. Also, with this praise came the demonstration that POST has room for improvement in other desired areas. These weaknesses are better identified through research than in the form of sensationalized legal repercussion.

Sam Walker (2011) appropriately stated that "(w)e should not seek perfection, only an improvement over what we have been doing. If it leads to a substantial improvement, even though less than perfect, it would be useful" (pg. 85). The current thesis has provided literary and empirical support that the CMPD offender-driven initiative known as the Priority

Offender Strategy Team is an effective crime reduction strategy. However, the program and its Executive Staff must not be satisfied with this conclusion. Rather, the demand for consistent assessment and persistent adaptability must remain.

REFERENCES

- Adler, F., Mueller, G. & Laufer, W. (2001). *Criminology* (4th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
- Auerhahn, K. (1999). Selective incapacitation and the problem of prediction. *Criminology*, Nov 1999; 37, 703-734.
- Auerhahn, K. (2002). Selective incapacitation, three strikes, and the problem of aging prison populations: Using simulation modeling to see the future. *Criminology and Public Policy*, 1, 353-387.
- Bhati, A. (2007). Estimating the number of crimes averted by incapacitation: An information theoretic approach. *Justice of Quantitative Criminology*, 23, 355-375.
- Blumstein, A., Farrington, D. & Moitra, S. (1985). Delinquency careers: Innocents, desisters, and persisters. *Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research*, 7, 187-220.
- Blumstein, A. (1995). *Prisons*. In J. Wilson & J. Petersilia (eds.), *Crime*. San Francisco: San Francisco Institute for Contemporary Studies.
- Bureau of Justice (2002). *Recidivism of prisoners released in 1994*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Bureau of Justice (2007). *Pre-Trial release of felony defendants in state courts*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Bureau of Justice (2011). *Criminal victimization, 2010*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Chelst, K. (1978). An algorithm for deploying a crime directed (tactical) patrol force. *Management Science (pre-1986)*, 24, 1314-1327.
- www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
- CMPD. (2011). KBCOPS [records management system]. Unpublished raw data.
- Cohen, L. & Felson, M. (1979). Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach. *American Sociological Review*, 44, 588-605.
- DNA initiative. Retrieved October 20, 2011 from www.dna.gov/solving-Crimes/property-crimes/va-experience.

- Durkheim, E. (1964). *The division of labor in society*. New York: Free Press.
- Eck, J. & Maquire, E. (2000). "Have changes in policing reduced violent crime? An assessment of the evidence," in Walker, S. (2011). *Sense and non-sense about crime, drugs, and communities* (7th Ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
- Fagan, J. & Guggenheim, M. (1996). Preventive detention and the judicial prediction of dangerousness for juveniles: A natural experiment. *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, 86, 415-448.
- Fairbrother, G. (2010). *Reducing theft from elderly victims in shopping areas* [Electronic Version]. Retrieved on October 24, 2011 from [www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2010/10-24\(F\).pdf](http://www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2010/10-24(F).pdf)
- Farrington, D. (1986). *Age and crime*. In Morris, N. & Tonry, M. (ed.), *Crime and justice*, (pp. 289–348). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Farrington, D. & Tarling, R. (1985). *Prediction in criminology*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2011). *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook*. Retrieved October 20, 2011 from www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/additional-ucr-publications/ucr_handbook.pdf
- Felson, M. (2006). *Crime and nature*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Greenwood, P. & Abrahamse, A. (1982). *Selective incapacitation*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
- Gresham, P., Stockdale, J., & Bartholomew, I. (2003). Evaluating the impact of crimestoppers. *Home Office Online Report*. Retrieved on October 20, 2011 from <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr2203.pdf>.
- Henry, V. (2002). *The compstat paradigm: Management accountability in policing, business, and the public sector*. New York: Loose Leaf Law Publications, Inc.
- Hirschi, T. (1969). *Causes of delinquency*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jacoby, J. & Mayer, W. (1989). *A review of the Repeat Offender Project of the Las Vegas, Nevada, Metropolitan Police Department: Technical assistance report*. Washington, DC: American University.
- Jennings, W. (2006). Revisiting prediction models in policing: Identifying high-risk offenders. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 31, 35-51.

- Jones, T. & Newbern, T. (2006). Three strikes and you're out. *British Journal of Criminology*, 46, 781-802.
- Levitt, S. (2004). Understanding why crime fell in the 1990s: Four factors that explain the decline and six that do not. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18, 163-190.
- Kappeler, V. (2006). *Police and Society* (3rd ed). Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press.
- Kelling, G., Pate, A., Dieckman, D., & Brown, C. (1974). *The Kansas City preventative patrol experiment*. Police Foundation Report. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.
- Kelling, G., Pate, A., Ferrera, A., Utne, M. & Brown, C. (1981). *The Newark foot patrol experiment*. Police Foundation Report. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.
- Kovandzic, T. (2001). The Impact of Florida's habitual offender law on crime. *Criminology*, 39, 179-203.
- Kurlycheck, M., Brame, R. & Bushway, S. (2006). Scarlet letters and recidivism: Does an old criminal record predict future offending? *Criminology and Public Policy*, 5, 483-503.
- Levitt, S. (2004). Understanding why crime fell in the 1990s: Four factors that explain the decline and six that do not. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18, 163-190.
- Liptak, A. (2008, April 23). Inmate count in US dwarfs other nations' [Electronic Version]. *New York Times*. Retrieved November 24, 2010, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html>
- Martin, S. & Sherman, L. (1986). *Catching career criminals*. Police Foundation Report. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.
- Marvell, T. & Moody, C. (1994). Prison population growth and crime reduction. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 10, 109-140.
- Messner, S. & Rosenfeld, R. (2007). *Crime and the American dream* (4th ed.). California: Wadworth, Cengage Learning.
- Piquero, A. & Blumstein, A. (2007). Does incapacitation reduce crime? *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 23, 267-285.
- Office of the Fayette Commonwealth's Attorney (n.d.). *Repeat Offender Prosecution Project*. Retrieved November 24, 2010, from <http://www.lexingtonprosecutor.com/Default.htm>

- Raymond, E. & Menifield, C. (2011). A tale of two cities: An exploratory study of consolidation and annexation policies in the cities of Memphis and Nashville. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 35, 404-441.
- Robinson, M. (2009). *Justice blind? Ideals and realities of American criminal justice* (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Robinson, M. (2011). *Media coverage of crime and criminal justice*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
- Schmit, J., Warner, K., & Gupta, S. (2010). *The high budgetary cost of incarceration* [Electronic Version]. Retrieved October 24, 2011 from www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/the-high-budgetary-cost-of-incarceration/.
- Shannon, L., McKim, J., Curry, J., & Haffner, L. (1988). *Criminal career continuity: Its social context*. New York: Human Sciences Press.
- Sherman, L. (1997). *Policing for crime prevention*. Retrieved August 25, 2011 from: <https://www.ncjrs.gov/works/chapter8.htm>
- Spelman, W. (1994). *Criminal incapacitation*. Plenum, New York.
- Spelman, W. (2005). *The limited importance of prison expansion*. In Blumstein, A. & Wallman (Eds.), *The Crime Drop in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Spelman, W. & Brown, D. (1984). *Calling the police: Citizen reporting of serious crime*. Washington, DC: Department of Justice.
- Stolzenberg, L. & D'Alessio, S. (1997). Three strikes and you're out: The impact of California's new mandatory sentencing law and serious crime rates. *Crime and Delinquency*, 43, 457-469.
- Temple, J. (2011). The merry-go-round of youth gangs: The failure of the U.S. immigration removal policy and the false outsourcing of crime. *Boston College Third World Law Journal*, 31, 193-215
- Tracy, P., Wolfgang, M., & Figlio, R. (1985). *Delinquency in two birth cohorts*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Walker, S. (2011). *Sense and non-sense about crime, drugs, and communities* (7th Ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
- Welsh, W. & Harris, P. (2008). *Criminal justice policy & planning* (3rd Ed.). Newark, NJ: Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.

- Wenk, E., Robinson, J., & Smith, G. (1972). Can violence be predicted? *Crime and Delinquency*, 18, 339-402.
- Wolfgang, M., Figlio, R., & Sellin, T. (1972). *Delinquency in a birth cohort*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Zhao, J., Scheider, M., & Thurman, Q. (2002). Funding community policing to reduce crime: Have COPS grants made a difference? *Criminology and Public Policy*, 2, 11.
- Zimring, F & Hawkins, G. (1995). *Incapacitation: Penal confinement and the restraint of crime*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Appendix A: Memorandum of Understanding

Memorandum of Understanding

Concerning the Establishment of the

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Priority Offender Strategy (POS)

Among the Undersigned Agencies

THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU), made and entered into between the undersigned agencies, sets forth guidelines regarding the establishment of a comprehensive Priority Offender Strategy for the City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County.

1. VISION STATEMENT

- 1.1 The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department will develop partnerships that foster an environment whereby priority offenders are identified, held accountable and shall not prey upon our citizens.

2. PURPOSE

- 2.1 Provide a framework and working mechanism for the organization of a priority offender program to address issues that are common to participating agencies and to assure the success of the initiative through the achievement of coordination and cooperation.
- 2.2 Define the working relationships of the parties to the MOU.
- 2.3 Outline the intent of the parties regarding the implementation, operation, and administration of a Priority Offender Strategy.

3. OBJECTIVES

- 3.1 Develop a formal criteria-based system that defines and identifies those whom we have determined to be a priority offender, and develop the methodology to share this classification with all of the agencies who may come in contact with a priority offender.
- 3.2 Establish, and adhere to, a regular and frequent meeting schedule for the program's participating agencies.

3.3 Establish a comprehensive victim inclusion standard to ensure that the victim(s) of the priority offender are kept informed about the offender/case status.

3.4 Identify the required staffing resources for each participating agency.

4. INTERAGENCY POLICY GROUP

4.1 The program will be managed by an Interagency Policy Group whose membership will include one command-level member from each participating agency.

4.2 The chairperson for the Interagency Policy Group will be selected by the group.

4.3 Each member will have an equal vote on all matters before the board.

4.4 The Interagency Policy Group will adopt a quarterly meeting schedule.

4.5 The Interagency Policy Group will provide quarterly reports on the activities of the program to the agency head of each participating agency.

4.6 The Interagency Policy Group may accept additional participating agencies to this MOU upon majority vote.

4.7 The Interagency Policy Group may appoint committees, working groups, and other entities to assist in the management and development of the program.

5. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP

5.1 Each participating agency in the program agrees to provide at least one staff member to represent them on the Interagency Working Group.

5.2 The chairperson for the Interagency Policy Group will be selected by the group.

5.3 The Interagency Working Group will adopt a bi-weekly meeting schedule.

5.4 Additional members may be assigned to this group as determined by the members of the Interagency Policy Group based on workload and the needs of the program.

6. FINANCIAL

- 6.1 Participating agency employees will carry out designated functions at their own agency's expense, including salaries and benefits and local transportation.
- 6.2 Should independent funding be obtained for the operation, or furtherance, of the program, the Interagency Policy Group shall determine how the funding will be utilized.

7. DISPUTE RESOLUTION

- 7.1 Any disputes that may arise between the participating agencies concerning the operations of the program shall be referred to the Interagency Policy Group for resolution.
- 7.2 The final decision on disputes will be made by the chairperson of the Interagency Policy Group.

8. AMENDMENTS

- 8.1 Amendments to this MOU shall be proposed upon a majority vote of the Interagency Policy Group and approval by all signatures to this MOU.
- 8.2 Acceptance of additional participating agencies shall be considered an amendment to this MOU and shall not cause the need for a new MOU.

9. DURATION AND TERMINATION

- 9.1 This MOU shall remain in existence until such time a participating agency withdraws from the agreement.
- 9.2 Any agency may withdraw from this agreement upon a 30-day notice in writing to the other participating agencies.

IN FURTHERANCE OF their respective goals, objectives, and missions, the parties jointly agree to abide by the provisions of this MOU.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this MOU to be duly executed.

Agency: _____

By: _____ Date: _____

Agency: _____

By: _____ Date: _____

Agency: _____

By: _____ Date: _____

Agency: _____

By: _____ Date: _____

Agency: _____

By: _____ Date: _____

Agency: _____

By: _____ Date: _____

Appendix B: POST Offender and Non-POST Offender Comparisons

1. **POST Offender 4**: from acceptance to POST on 2/26/2009 until 4/30/2009, this offender was named in 0 Index offenses. At this point, POST Offender 4 was incarcerated. From release on 9/4/2009 until 6/17/2011, this offender was named as a suspect in 6 incidents (5 Index). This offender was on Probation, as well as NCDOCC ordered EM for a portion of the evaluation period. This offender ranked 8. This offender was documented as a POST success.

Control Offender 818: from 2/25/2009 until 4/30/2009, this offender was named in 2 Index offenses. During POST Offender 4's first incarceration period (5/1/2009 – 9/4/2009), Control Offender 818 was named in 2 Index offenses. Upon POST Offender 4's release period of 9/4/2009 until 6/17/2011, Control Offender 818 was named as a suspect in 23 Index offenses. Since POST Offender 4's incarceration, Control Offender 818 was named as a suspect in 2 additional Index offenses before being incarcerated on 6/20/2011. This offender ranked 9. This offender has never been on POST.

2. **POST Offender 184**: from acceptance to POST on 10/29/2008 until 12/15/2009, this offender was named as a suspect in 3 Index offenses. This offender was on probation during the evaluation period. This offender ranked 28. This offender was documented as a POST success.

Control Offender 851: From 10/29/2009 until 12/15/2009, this offender was named as a suspect in 7 Index offenses. During POST Offender 184's incarceration (12/15/2009 – present), Control Offender 851 has been named as a suspect in 6 additional Index offenses. This offender was on probation and EM during the evaluation period. This offender ranked 17. This offender has never been on POST.

3. **POST Offender 322**: from acceptance to POST on 12/01/2009 until 01/14/2009, this offender was named in 1 Index offense, before being incarcerated. This offender ranked 30. This offender was documented as a POST success.

Control Offender 791: from 12/01/2009 until 01/14/2009, this offender was named in 1 Index offense. Since POST Offender 322's incarceration on 01/14/2009, Control Offender 23 has been named as a suspect in 25 index offenses. This offender was also on probation and EM during the evaluation period. This offender ranked 25. This offender has never been on POST.

4. **POST Offender 59**: from acceptance to POST on 02/26/2009 until 03/31/2009, this offender was named as a suspect in 3 Index offenses, before being incarcerated. From the offender's release on 12/29/2009 until 08/02/2011, this offender was named as a suspect in 1 Index offense before being incarcerated. This offender ranked 39. This offender was on probation and EM during the evaluation period. This offender was documented as a POST success.

Control Offender 693: from 02/26/2009 until 03/31/2009, this offender was named as a suspect in 0 Index offenses. During POST Offender 59's incarceration (03/31/2009 – 12/29/2009), Control Offender 693 was named as a suspect in 5 Index offenses. Upon POST Offender 59's release on 12/29/2009 until 08/02/2011, Control Offender 693 has been named as a suspect in 10 Index offenses. This offender was on probation during the evaluation period. This offender ranked 47. This offender has never been on POST.

5. **POST Offender 597**: from acceptance to POST on 01/08/2010 until 03/03/2010, this offender was listed as a suspect in 0 Index offenses. From this offender's release on 07/19/2010 until 12/08/2010, this offender was listed as a suspect in 1 Index offense. This offender was on EM during the evaluation period. This offender is ranked 103. This offender was documented as a POST success.

Control Offender 819: From 01/08/2010 until 03/03/2010, this offender was named as a suspect in 0 Index offenses. During POST Offender 597's incarceration (03/03/2010 – 07/19/2010), Control Offender 819 was listed as a suspect in 1 Index offense and was incarcerated. This offender was on probation during the evaluation period. This offender is ranked 96. This offender has never been on POST.

Appendix C: POST Program Recommendations

1. Write a POST program mission statement
2. Maintain the currently-stated goals, but establish specific, operationally-defined objectives for each goal
3. Establish a consistent method of collecting the data to measure the objectives
4. Conduct quarterly recalculation of the “control offender” query, recommending any newly-identified motivated offenders
5. Propose a policy for speedy disposition of POST offender cases
6. Engage in additional research

Appendix D: Tables

TABLE 1: POST Offender Felony Case Accountability After POST Start Date (n = 357)

Offender Number	<u>Date On POST</u>	<u>Number Of Cases</u>	<u>Guilty Case Count</u>	<u>Pct Accountability</u>
1	10/6/2008	5	1	20.00%
2	8/20/2008	2	1	50.00%
3	7/8/2008	2		
4	9/25/2009	9	5	55.56%
5	12/1/2008	8	4	50.00%
6	12/17/2008	6	2	33.33%
7	5/28/2008			
8	12/1/2008			
9	12/15/2010	11	5	45.45%
10	12/1/2008	8	1	12.50%
11	8/27/2008	8	2	25.00%
12	12/15/2010	7	2	28.57%
13	11/13/2009	4	2	50.00%
14	3/16/2009	1	1	100.00%
15	9/25/2009	4	4	100.00%
16	12/1/2008	1		
17	10/20/2010			
18	6/11/2010	6	4	66.67%
19	9/9/2010	3	1	33.33%
20	7/1/2008	4		
21	4/20/2011			
22	7/16/2008	3	3	100.00%
23	5/28/2008	3	3	100.00%
24	10/6/2008	13	3	23.08%
25	9/25/2009	4	1	25.00%
26	7/1/2008	2	1	50.00%
27	12/17/2008	1	1	100.00%
28	8/20/2008			
29	5/28/2008	4	3	75.00%
30	12/17/2008	5	2	40.00%
31	5/29/2008	4	2	50.00%
32	7/1/2008	8	5	62.50%
33	12/1/2008	7	4	57.14%
34	11/13/2009	3	3	100.00%
35	9/25/2009			
36	12/1/2008			

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 75

37	2/4/2010	6	1	16.67%
38	2/4/2010	6	3	50.00%
39	9/22/2008	10	5	50.00%
40	5/29/2008	7	1	14.29%
41	5/28/2008			
42	10/22/2008	5	1	20.00%
43	12/17/2008	5	2	40.00%
44	9/22/2008			
45	11/13/2009	5		
46	6/1/2009	6	5	83.33%
47	12/17/2008	14	4	28.57%
48	12/1/2008	7	6	85.71%
49	7/27/2011	2		
50	3/23/2009			
51	12/1/2008	7	4	57.14%
52	1/30/2009	2	1	50.00%
53	1/30/2009	5		
54	12/17/2008	11	2	18.18%
55	5/29/2008	6	1	16.67%
56	1/30/2009	2		
57	6/1/2009	8	4	50.00%
58	12/17/2008	3	1	33.33%
59	5/29/2008	14	4	28.57%
60	6/11/2010	8	4	50.00%
61	5/17/2010	10	3	30.00%
62	5/28/2008	5		
63	6/1/2009	9	3	33.33%
64	12/17/2008	3		
65	4/6/2011	3		
66	5/29/2008	14	2	14.29%
67	12/17/2008	5	4	80.00%
68	1/30/2009	9	2	22.22%
69	12/1/2008	7	2	28.57%
70	12/18/2008	6	1	16.67%
71	8/27/2008			
72	8/20/2008	3		
73	3/25/2009	38	11	28.95%
74	6/4/2008	2	2	100.00%
75	5/28/2008	4	3	75.00%
76	8/20/2008	6	3	50.00%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 76

77	12/17/2008	11	2	18.18%
78	12/17/2008			
79	12/1/2008			
80	9/12/2011	2		
81	3/23/2009	6		
82	6/30/2010	3		
83	8/20/2008			
84	1/12/2011	3	1	33.33%
85	5/29/2008	3	1	33.33%
86	2/26/2009	4	2	50.00%
87	12/17/2008			
88	1/30/2009	3	2	66.67%
89	8/25/2010			
90	6/30/2010	6		
91	9/9/2010	4		
92	12/1/2008	2		
93	12/1/2008	5	2	40.00%
94	6/11/2010			
95	7/1/2008	3	2	66.67%
96	3/25/2009	5	3	60.00%
97	12/17/2008	3		
98	12/17/2008	1	1	100.00%
99	11/13/2009	3	2	66.67%
100	9/22/2010	3	2	66.67%
101	12/1/2008	10	4	40.00%
102	6/1/2009	5	2	40.00%
103	5/29/2008	20	7	35.00%
104	1/30/2009	7	3	42.86%
105	5/22/2008	6		
106	1/30/2009	5	1	20.00%
107	12/1/2008	7	3	42.86%
108	5/29/2008	6		
109	7/14/2010	8	2	25.00%
110	12/17/2008	8	4	50.00%
111	12/17/2008	11	3	27.27%
112	9/25/2009	9	2	22.22%
113	7/1/2008	1		
114	1/8/2010			
115	6/24/2009	5	1	20.00%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 77

116	4/6/2011	11		
117	2/5/2010	7	2	28.57%
118	11/13/2009	13	8	61.54%
119	12/17/2008			
120	6/1/2009	4	2	50.00%
121	12/17/2008			
122	5/28/2008	4	2	50.00%
123	11/3/2010	2		
124	12/1/2008	6	1	16.67%
125	3/25/2009	14	5	35.71%
126	8/10/2011			
127	2/4/2010	10	2	20.00%
128	1/8/2010			
129	8/25/2010	3	2	66.67%
130	5/28/2008	9	4	44.44%
131	5/29/2008			
132	5/28/2008	8	4	50.00%
133	2/26/2009	7	4	57.14%
134	5/28/2008	6	2	33.33%
135	9/25/2009	3	1	33.33%
136	5/28/2008			
137	11/17/2010			
138	7/14/2010			
139	3/9/2011	6	2	33.33%
140	9/22/2010	8	2	25.00%
141	12/1/2008			
142	6/1/2009	7		
143	12/17/2008			
144	12/1/2008	4	3	75.00%
145	5/28/2008	11	6	54.55%
146	12/17/2008	15		
147	3/25/2009	4	1	25.00%
148	8/16/2010	11	3	27.27%
149	12/17/2008	16	4	25.00%
150	3/25/2009	3	3	100.00%
151	11/13/2009	7	1	14.29%
152	6/11/2010	3	2	66.67%
153	11/13/2009	3	2	66.67%
154	12/1/2010	4	2	50.00%
155	8/17/2009	5	3	60.00%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 78

156	5/28/2008	7	7	100.00%
157	7/14/2010	4	1	25.00%
158	7/25/2008	3		
159	5/28/2008	13		
160	10/20/2010	3	1	33.33%
161	6/11/2010			
162	5/28/2008	3		
163	10/16/2009	1	1	100.00%
164	6/30/2010	1		
165	7/1/2008	6	1	16.67%
166	12/17/2008	11	3	27.27%
167	4/16/2010	7	3	42.86%
168	7/1/2008	12	4	33.33%
169	7/23/2008	9	3	33.33%
170	7/28/2008			
171	12/17/2008	8		
172	1/30/2009	11	3	27.27%
173	6/11/2010	8	2	25.00%
174	5/22/2008	10	4	40.00%
175	5/28/2008			
176	5/29/2008	4	3	75.00%
177	8/25/2010	1	1	100.00%
178	2/26/2009	12	5	41.67%
179	5/22/2008	5		
180	12/1/2008	5	3	60.00%
181	12/17/2008	6	3	50.00%
182	12/18/2008	6	4	66.67%
183	3/9/2011	3	2	66.67%
184	3/25/2009			
185	12/17/2008	6	2	33.33%
186	11/5/2009			
187	11/6/2009	7	2	28.57%
188	12/17/2008	10	5	50.00%
189	8/27/2008	6	3	50.00%
190	3/16/2009	6	3	50.00%
191	8/25/2010	16	5	31.25%
192	5/28/2008	12	7	58.33%
193	7/27/2011			
194	12/17/2008			
195	12/17/2008	6	3	50.00%
196	8/28/2008	10	3	30.00%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 79

197	3/17/2009			
198	7/13/2011	3		
199	12/1/2010			
200	7/27/2011			
201	8/25/2010	9	3	33.33%
202	2/4/2010	7	2	28.57%
203	8/17/2009	1		
204	1/8/2010	8		
205	3/25/2009	3		
206	8/17/2009	5	2	40.00%
207	1/28/2011	1		
208	11/13/2009	5	4	80.00%
209	5/17/2010	2	1	50.00%
210	3/16/2009	19	4	21.05%
211	7/14/2010	3		
212	5/29/2008	4	1	25.00%
213	5/28/2008	14	5	35.71%
214	1/8/2010			
215	6/1/2009	6	2	33.33%
216	12/17/2008	4		
217	9/25/2009	4		
218	5/28/2008	6	2	33.33%
219	7/28/2010	10	1	10.00%
220	5/28/2008	5	2	40.00%
221	1/30/2009	11	2	18.18%
222	5/29/2008	5	5	100.00%
223	12/17/2008	1	1	100.00%
224	12/17/2008	1	1	100.00%
225	2/4/2010	5	2	40.00%
226	7/14/2010	4		
227	8/16/2010	2	1	50.00%
228	10/16/2009	3	1	33.33%
229	10/1/2008	11	6	54.55%
230	11/13/2009	3	1	33.33%
231	2/26/2009	3	3	100.00%
232	5/28/2008	3	1	33.33%
233	11/13/2009	4	1	25.00%
234	12/17/2008	2	1	50.00%
235	6/1/2009			
236	12/1/2008	14	6	42.86%
237	9/22/2008	7	2	28.57%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 80

238	10/16/2009	3		
239	8/13/2008	22	6	27.27%
240	9/25/2009	7	4	57.14%
241	5/28/2008	13	7	53.85%
242	3/9/2011			
243	12/17/2008	11	1	9.09%
244	5/28/2008	23	6	26.09%
245	8/17/2009	12	2	16.67%
246	12/17/2008	2		
247	5/28/2008	16	9	56.25%
248	1/8/2010	4	1	25.00%
249	5/28/2008	5	3	60.00%
250	3/25/2009	2	1	50.00%
251	3/15/2010			
252	5/28/2008	9	4	44.44%
253	12/17/2008			
254	9/16/2009	4	1	25.00%
255	3/25/2009	1		
256	12/17/2008	12	1	8.33%
257	12/17/2008	5	3	60.00%
258	7/11/2008	8	4	50.00%
259	3/9/2011	1		
260	12/17/2008	6		
261	7/28/2008	2	1	50.00%
262	11/13/2009	6	3	50.00%
263	8/17/2009	5	1	20.00%
264	5/28/2008	11	5	45.45%
265	1/8/2010	1		
266	5/28/2008	9	4	44.44%
267	12/17/2008	7	3	42.86%
268	11/13/2009	1		
269	3/31/2010	11	3	27.27%
270	4/6/2011	3		
271	11/13/2009	10	8	80.00%
272	5/28/2008	15	6	40.00%
273	3/31/2010	5		
274	3/25/2009	7		
275	8/16/2010			
276	1/30/2009	4	1	25.00%
277	4/16/2010	4	4	100.00%
278	8/17/2009	6	1	16.67%

279	3/25/2009	4	2	50.00%
280	12/17/2008	6	1	16.67%
281	10/15/2009	10	2	20.00%
282	6/11/2010	5	1	20.00%
283	9/25/2009			
284	8/17/2009	11	2	18.18%
285	12/1/2010	2	1	50.00%
286	1/12/2011	1		
287	10/16/2009	3	1	33.33%
288	6/11/2010	1		
289	12/17/2008	5	4	80.00%
290	5/28/2008	6	3	50.00%
291	12/17/2008	8	3	37.50%
292	12/16/2010	2	1	50.00%
293	3/15/2010			
294	6/1/2009	8	3	37.50%
295	10/20/2010	11	3	27.27%
296	11/17/2010			
297	7/15/2008			
298	8/12/2010	4	2	50.00%
299	5/28/2008	2	2	100.00%
300	6/1/2009			
301	1/8/2010			
302	12/17/2008	11	2	18.18%
303	2/4/2010	7	4	57.14%
304	3/15/2010			
305	1/30/2009	4	2	50.00%
306	6/11/2010	1		
307	6/1/2009	7	3	42.86%
308	11/13/2009	3	2	66.67%
309	8/25/2010	8	4	50.00%
310	11/13/2009	4	1	25.00%
311	1/8/2010	10	3	30.00%
312	11/17/2010	6	2	33.33%
313	10/16/2009	3		
314	5/22/2008			
315	5/17/2010	1		
316	6/11/2010	6	4	66.67%
317	12/17/2008	7		
318	8/10/2011			
319	8/10/2011	4		

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 82

320	4/16/2010	4		
321	3/28/2011			
322	10/6/2010	4		
323	1/28/2011	2	1	50.00%
324	9/24/2009	7	4	57.14%
325	1/8/2010	1		
326	1/8/2010	11	4	36.36%
327	10/7/2011			
328	6/11/2010	1	1	100.00%
329	9/25/2009	10	3	30.00%
330	11/13/2009	8	3	37.50%
331	1/8/2010	5	1	20.00%
332	2/4/2010	5	1	20.00%
333	9/22/2010	3	1	33.33%
334	6/15/2011	4		
335	6/15/2011			
336	3/31/2010			
337	9/25/2009	1	1	100.00%
338	10/16/2009			
339	7/27/2011	1		
340	1/8/2010	4		
341	9/22/2010	2	1	50.00%
342	1/8/2010	3	2	66.67%
343	6/1/2011	5	1	20.00%
344	3/31/2010	7	5	71.43%
345	7/28/2010	1		
346	11/17/2010	7	4	57.14%
347	3/15/2010			
348	10/7/2010	1		
349	12/1/2010	5	4	80.00%
350	6/11/2010	7	6	85.71%
351	1/11/2011	1		
352	9/21/2011			
353	6/16/2011			
354	7/13/2011			
355	2/9/2011			
356	7/13/2011	1		
357	6/1/2011	1	1	100.00%
		1793	621	34.63%

TABLE 2: Control Offender Felony Case Accountability (n = 69)

Offender Number	<u>Number Of Cases</u>	<u>Guilty Case Count</u>	<u>Pct Accountability</u>
1	25	2	8.00%
2	17	10	58.82%
3	27	14	51.85%
4	5	3	60.00%
5	34	20	58.82%
6	18	8	44.44%
7	4	3	75.00%
8	12	10	83.33%
9	18	9	50.00%
10	7	2	28.57%
11	30	18	60.00%
12	14	8	57.14%
13	21	4	19.05%
14	25	6	24.00%
15	20	7	35.00%
16	21	5	23.81%
17	8	3	37.50%
18	24	8	33.33%
19	13	3	23.08%
20	21	10	47.62%
21	8	2	25.00%
22	17	3	17.65%
23	12	4	33.33%
24	22	14	63.64%
25	19	12	63.16%
26	10	5	50.00%
27	19	4	21.05%
28	7	3	42.86%
29	9	5	55.56%
30	10	9	90.00%
31	14	12	85.71%
32	26	3	11.54%
33	16	4	25.00%
34	18	10	55.56%
35	14	9	64.29%
36	10	4	40.00%
37	17	6	35.29%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 84

38	31	11	35.48%
39	9	6	66.67%
40	22	12	54.55%
41	8	3	37.50%
42	25	13	52.00%
43	13	5	38.46%
44	15	7	46.67%
45	28	9	32.14%
46	5	3	60.00%
47	24	11	45.83%
48	11	6	54.55%
49	6		
50	18	6	33.33%
51	19	9	47.37%
52	9	3	33.33%
53	13	12	92.31%
54	4	3	75.00%
55	18	8	44.44%
56	10	5	50.00%
57	8	5	62.50%
58	10	6	60.00%
59	5	2	40.00%
60	6	2	33.33%
61	5		
62	3	2	66.67%
63	5	2	40.00%
64	6	5	83.33%
65	11	1	9.09%
66	5	3	60.00%
67	8	5	62.50%
68	7		
69	2		
	981	427	43.53%

** Start date was 05/28/2008

TABLE 3: POST Offender Felony Case Accountability Before POST Start Date (n = 357)

Offender Number	<u>Number Of Cases</u>	<u>Guilty Case Count</u>	<u>Pct Accountability</u>
1	7		
2	3		
3	11	2	18.18%
4	9	5	55.56%
5	8	3	37.50%
6	3	3	100.00%
7	4	2	50.00%
8			
9	4	4	100.00%
10	11	8	72.73%
11	26	1	3.85%
12	5	1	20.00%
13	22	18	81.82%
14			
15	3	2	66.67%
16	6	2	33.33%
17			
18	13	5	38.46%
19	7	1	14.29%
20	13	3	23.08%
21	13	11	84.62%
22	5	4	80.00%
23	3		
24	7	4	57.14%
25	11	6	54.55%
26	7	1	14.29%
27	7	5	71.43%
28	1	1	100.00%
29	3	1	33.33%
30	4	2	50.00%
31	3		
32	3	2	66.67%
33	15	11	73.33%
34	2	1	50.00%
35			
36	2	2	100.00%
37	6	1	16.67%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 86

38	9	5	55.56%
39	14	4	28.57%
40	18		
41	5	1	20.00%
42	6	2	33.33%
43	3		
44			
45	8	3	37.50%
46	6	4	66.67%
47	12	6	50.00%
48	16	8	50.00%
49	4	3	75.00%
50			
51	12	2	16.67%
52	9	6	66.67%
53	7	2	28.57%
54	8	5	62.50%
55			
56	7		
57	2		
58			
59	12	1	8.33%
60	8	4	50.00%
61	5	1	20.00%
62	6	2	33.33%
63	19	11	57.89%
64	1		
65			
66	14	8	57.14%
67	9	4	44.44%
68	3	2	66.67%
69	11	6	54.55%
70	8		
71	4	1	25.00%
72	6	2	33.33%
73	25	13	52.00%
74	5	2	40.00%
75	3	1	33.33%
76	10	5	50.00%
77	30	8	26.67%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 87

78			
79	7	5	71.43%
80	7	1	14.29%
81	2	1	50.00%
82	2		
83			
84	9	3	33.33%
85	4	1	25.00%
86	8	5	62.50%
87			
88	4	2	50.00%
89	8	2	25.00%
90	3		
91			
92	8		
93	16	3	18.75%
94	2		
95	10	6	60.00%
96	4		
97	6		
98	1	1	100.00%
99	4	1	25.00%
100	15	8	53.33%
101	18	10	55.56%
102	4	4	100.00%
103	11	8	72.73%
104	26	4	15.38%
105	5	3	60.00%
106	4	2	50.00%
107	10	4	40.00%
108	12	4	33.33%
109	21	6	28.57%
110	5	3	60.00%
111	19	5	26.32%
112	11	4	36.36%
113	4		
114			
115	6	3	50.00%
116	3	1	33.33%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 88

117	19	8	42.11%
118	13	6	46.15%
119			
120	4	1	25.00%
121	1		
122	7	3	42.86%
123	11	2	18.18%
124	16	5	31.25%
125	10	2	20.00%
126	7	4	57.14%
127	18	2	11.11%
128	2		
129			
130	6	2	33.33%
131			
132	11		
133	16	11	68.75%
134	12	7	58.33%
135	2	1	50.00%
136			
137			
138			
139	9	2	22.22%
140	14	1	7.14%
141	1		
142	10	8	80.00%
143			
144	14	8	57.14%
145	16	1	6.25%
146	12	2	16.67%
147	7	3	42.86%
148	15	5	33.33%
149	26	11	42.31%
150	18	7	38.89%
151	3	3	100.00%
152	6	3	50.00%
153	8	4	50.00%
154	9	8	88.89%
155	4	2	50.00%
156			
157	2		

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 89

158	11	7	63.64%
159	9	1	11.11%
160	10	3	30.00%
161			
162	11	5	45.45%
163	10	5	50.00%
164	5		
165	6	4	66.67%
166	7	2	28.57%
167	8	7	87.50%
168	23	7	30.43%
169	8	5	62.50%
170			
171	5	1	20.00%
172	10	5	50.00%
173	15	3	20.00%
174	6		
175	9	1	11.11%
176	8	5	62.50%
177	4		
178	11	3	27.27%
179	2		
180	10	7	70.00%
181	9	4	44.44%
182	3	3	100.00%
183	3	2	66.67%
184			
185	5	4	80.00%
186			
187	5	1	20.00%
188	8	3	37.50%
189	5	2	40.00%
190	7	7	100.00%
191	2		
192	6		
193			
194			
195	4	3	75.00%
196	14	4	28.57%
197	6	1	16.67%
198	13	5	38.46%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 90

199	4	2	50.00%
200	2	2	100.00%
201	5	2	40.00%
202	13	5	38.46%
203			
204	5	1	20.00%
205	2		
206	6	3	50.00%
207	11	7	63.64%
208	3	1	33.33%
209	3	1	33.33%
210	6	1	16.67%
211	7	2	28.57%
212	5	1	20.00%
213	7	3	42.86%
214			
215	3		
216	11	1	9.09%
217	5	1	20.00%
218	4	2	50.00%
219	13	9	69.23%
220	4	1	25.00%
221	9		
222	13	5	38.46%
223	3	1	33.33%
224	3	1	33.33%
225	8	2	25.00%
226	6	2	33.33%
227	6	2	33.33%
228	1		
229	6	3	50.00%
230	4		
231	7	3	42.86%
232	10	6	60.00%
233	4	1	25.00%
234	6	3	50.00%
235	1		
236	10	3	30.00%
237	4	2	50.00%
238	4	2	50.00%
239	4	1	25.00%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 91

240	5	4	80.00%
241	5	2	40.00%
242	2	2	100.00%
243	5	1	20.00%
244	14	3	21.43%
245	4	2	50.00%
246	2	1	50.00%
247	12	4	33.33%
248	1		
249	9	2	22.22%
250	2	1	50.00%
251			
252	9	7	77.78%
253			
254	8		
255	1	1	100.00%
256	3	1	33.33%
257	3	2	66.67%
258	5	2	40.00%
259	5	3	60.00%
260	1	1	100.00%
261	2	2	100.00%
262	7	6	85.71%
263	10	7	70.00%
264	9		
265	3	2	66.67%
266	6		
267	6	2	33.33%
268			
269	6	3	50.00%
270	3	1	33.33%
271	2	1	50.00%
272	9		
273	1		
274	1		
275			
276	3	2	66.67%
277	3		
278	2		
279			
280	4	2	50.00%

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 92

281			
282	1	1	100.00%
283			
284	3		
285	1		
286			
287			
288			
289	3	1	33.33%
290	1		
291	1		
292			
293	1		
294	2		
295			
296			
297			
298	1		
299	1		
300			
301	1		
302			
303	1		
304			
305			
306			
307			
308			
309			
310			
311			
312			
313			
314			
315			
316			
317			
318			
319			
320			

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 93

321			
322			
323			
324			
325			
326			
327			
328			
329	8		
330			
331			
332			
333			
334			
335			
336			
337			
338			
339			
340			
341			
342			
343			
344			
345			
346			
347			
348			
349			
350			
351			
352			
353			
354			
355			
356			
357			
	1884	717	38.06%

TABLE 4: Pre-POST and Post-POST Suspect Incidents (n = 166)

Offender Number	Pre-POST Incidents	Post-POST Incidents
1	1	0
2	8	0
3	3	1
4	2	0
5	7	0
6	4	1
7	3	1
8	3	0
9	1	1
10	1	0
11	1	0
12	1	1
13	2	1
14	7	1
15	3	1
16	2	0
17	0	1
18	5	3
19	1	0
20	2	2
21	2	13
22	2	0
23	0	2
24	1	2
25	3	3
26	11	0
27	2	0
28	11	1
29	5	1
30	2	1
31	1	0
32	8	0
33	1	1
34	3	0
35	5	1
36	1	0
37	5	0
38	3	1
39	0	1
40	1	1
41	2	0
42	2	0
43	1	0
44	1	4

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 95

45	11	0
46	1	0
47	5	3
48	4	0
49	0	1
50	2	2
51	13	0
52	2	0
53	2	1
54	1	0
55	1	0
56	1	1
57	0	1
58	2	0
59	2	0
60	1	1
61	3	1
62	8	1
63	2	0
64	2	1
65	3	0
66	2	0
67	2	1
68	1	0
69	6	3
70	1	0
71	2	0
72	1	1
73	1	1
74	13	0
75	1	0
76	1	2
77	1	1
78	1	0
79	0	1
80	3	2
81	4	0
82	8	1
83	1	0
84	5	1
85	1	0
86	4	0
87	1	0
88	2	0
89	2	0
90	4	0
91	3	1

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 96

92	3	0
93	4	1
94	0	1
95	3	0
96	6	1
97	6	3
98	1	1
99	1	2
100	0	1
101	11	0
102	2	0
103	1	1
104	2	0
105	4	4
106	3	0
107	2	0
108	3	2
109	6	1
110	1	0
111	2	1
112	1	3
113	4	0
114	2	1
115	1	0
116	3	0
117	4	0
118	4	0
119	4	1
120	4	2
121	5	1
122	1	0
123	1	1
124	2	2
125	1	2
126	1	0
127	2	0
128	0	1
129	1	0
130	0	4
131	5	0
132	3	0
133	10	1
134	2	0
135	0	1
136	5	0
137	1	0
138	3	0

PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 97

139	3	0
140	3	1
141	4	1
142	3	0
143	6	0
144	4	0
145	3	4
146	2	5
147	5	2
148	2	1
149	2	0
150	1	0
151	15	1
152	1	0
153	1	0
154	2	1
155	8	0
156	4	1
157	21	3
158	1	1
159	4	0
160	1	1
161	2	0
162	2	0
163	1	3
164	1	0
165	1	0
166	2	0

TABLE 5: Pre-POST and Post-POST Paired T-Test (n = 166)

Group	Pre-POST	Post-POST
Mean	3.03	0.83
SD	3.08	1.39
SEM	0.24	0.11

** p < 0.0001

TABLE 6: Charlotte 2009 – 2010 Part I Crime Rates (CMPD, 2011)

	2009 Avg Per Week	2010 Avg Per Week
VIOLENT CRIMES		
HOMICIDE	1.0	1.1
RAPE	5.5	4.4
ROBBERY	44.8	34.4
Commercial Robbery	9.2	7.1
Personal Robbery	35.6	27.3
Home Invasion	4.0	3.0
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	42.3	41.6
ADW-GUN	14.6	13.5
TOTAL VIOLENT	93.7	81.5
	Pr Avg Week	Avg Week
PROPERTY CRIMES		
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY	148.7	139.9
Storage Shed Burglary	3.7	5.1
COMMERCIAL BURGLARY	33.4	30.2
AUTO THEFT	63.2	49.9
LARCENY	484.0	432.8
Larceny from Auto	238.1	192.2
Shoplifting	72.0	70.6
Vehicle Tag Stolen	29.0	25.2
TOTAL PROPERTY	729.3	652.9
TOTAL PART I CRIMES	823.0	734.5

TABLE 7: Reported Part I Incidents in Charlotte 2008-2010 (CMPD, 2011)

Crime Type	Detailed Crime Type	2008		2009		2010		Three Year Average (2008-2010)
		Reports	Monthly Average	Reports	Monthly Average	Reports	Monthly Average	
HOMICIDE		76	6.3	53	4.4	57	4.8	5.2
RAPE		267	22.3	289	24.1	228	19.0	21.8
ROBBERY		2935	248.8	2338	194.8	1794	149.5	197.7
	ROBBERY-PERSONAL	2375	197.9	1858	154.8	1425	118.8	157.2
	ROBBERY-COMMERCIAL	610	50.8	480	40.0	369	30.8	40.5
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT		2662	221.8	2209	184.1	2175	181.3	195.7
	ADW/GUN	1119	93.3	761	63.4	706	58.8	71.8
BURGLARY		11816	986.3	9503	791.9	8382	740.2	839.5
	COMMERCIAL BURGLARY	2787	232.3	1747	145.6	1582	131.8	169.9
	RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY	8954	746.2	7564	630.3	7032	586.0	654.2
	RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY-STORAGE BLDG	95	7.9	192	16.0	268	22.3	15.4
LARCENY		25723	2476.9	25352	2112.7	22724	1893.7	2161.1
	LARCENY-BICYCLE	243	20.3	267	22.3	280	23.3	21.9
	LARCENY-COIN OPERATED MACHINE	107	8.9	89	7.4	58	4.8	7.1
	LARCENY-FROM AUTO	16059	1338.3	12454	1037.8	10071	839.3	1071.8
	LARCENY-FROM BUILDING	1534	127.8	1053	87.8	950	79.2	98.3
	LARCENY-OTHER	8222	685.2	7367	613.9	7279	606.6	635.2
	LARCENY-POCKET PICKING	130	10.8	181	15.1	224	18.7	14.9
	LARCENY-FURSE SNATCHING	196	16.3	178	14.8	165	13.8	15.0
	LARCENY-SHOPLIFTING	3212	269.3	3763	313.6	3697	308.1	297.0
AUTO THEFT		5255	437.9	3305	275.4	2606	217.2	310.2
VIOLENT CRIME		5990	499.2	4889	407.4	4254	354.5	420.4
PROPERTY CRIME		46814	3901.2	38160	3180.0	34212	2851.0	3310.7
PART I		52804	4400.3	43049	3587.4	38466	3205.5	3711.1

TABLE 8: Weighted Values for POST Nominations (CMPD, 2011)

Factor	Weighted Value
Progression	10
Felony Convictions	9
Felony Charges	7
Listed as Suspect	5
Contact Decay	5
Raid and Search	4
Misdemeanor Charge	3
Field Interview	1

TABLE 9: Reported Part I Incidents in Charlotte 1999-2009 (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html)

Crime In Charlotte by Year											
Type	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Murders	84	74	66	67	66	59	85	83	76	83	53
per 100,000	13.9	11.8	10.4	10.4	9.9	8.9	12.8	11.9	10.4	10.9	7.5
Rapes	282	333	293	289	366	312	323	346	282	272	393
per 100,000	43.3	49.3	45.0	44.7	45.8	47.1	47.7	49.5	38.5	35.8	39.0
Robberies	2,517	2,651	2,566	2,693	2,683	2,766	3,649	3,207	3,191	2,924	2,343
per 100,000	416.1	423.9	410.7	417.2	402.4	420.9	538.9	458.5	435.2	393.3	391.7
Assaults	5,275	4,452	4,420	4,334	4,134	4,116	3,878	3,695	3,624	3,731	2,918
per 100,000	872.0	716.7	694.5	679.0	618.9	622.2	572.4	557.1	502.4	451.7	375.2
Burglaries	10,314	9,558	10,265	10,516	11,056	12,021	12,763	13,582	12,943	11,933	9,817
per 100,000	1705.9	1534.8	1616.0	1625.7	1658.6	1816.2	1837.8	1942.0	1765.7	1572.7	1262.3
Thefts	30,113	27,769	27,291	25,850	26,626	28,129	26,703	28,154	32,313	29,735	25,379
per 100,000	4978.4	4443.6	4287.9	3937.7	3998.2	4249.8	3944.3	4325.5	4495.6	3918.6	3283.3
Auto thefts	4,845	4,561	4,408	4,633	6,840	6,777	7,038	7,150	6,018	5,268	3,337
per 100,000	600.9	726.3	662.3	717.0	1023.9	1023.9	1043.3	1022.3	823.7	694.0	429.1
Arson	260	315	317	455	300	347	317	345	363	336	249
per 100,000	47.9	50.4	49.8	70.3	44.9	52.4	45.6	49.5	52.9	44.3	32.0
City-data.com crime index (higher means more crime, U.S. average = 319.2)	754.6	686.6	687.2	684.9	667.4	694.9	723.2	700.7	657.1	597.5	471.3

Appendix E: Figures




FIGURE 1: Accountability of Pre-POST, POST and Control Offenders




FIGURE 2: Pre-POST and Post-POST Number of Incidents




FIGURE 3: CMPD clearance rates 2007 – August 2011




FIGURE 4: Charlotte Burglaries Compared to US Average 1999-2009 (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html)




FIGURE 5: Examples of Processes for Planned Change Implementation

VITA

Derrick Wesley Lail was born in Hudson, North Carolina, on February 20, 1984. He attended grade school in Hudson and graduated from South Caldwell High School in 2002. The following autumn, he entered Appalachian State University, and in August 2006, he was awarded a Bachelor of Arts Degree with honors in Psychology and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Criminal Justice. He also received a minor in Spanish. In the Fall of 2009, he began his pursuit of a Master of Science Degree in Criminal Justice and Criminology with Appalachian State University, to be completed in December 2011.

Mr. Lail is currently the Criminal Intelligence Officer with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. He now resides in Locust, North Carolina, with his wife and two children. He intends to commence his work on a Ph.D. in Public Policy in the near future.